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DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE:
CAN INTERNET VOTING SAVE
THE ELECTORAL PROCESS?
BRYAN MERCURIOt

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the 2000 United States Presidential election, a lack of preparation among electoral administrators, the widespread use of outdated and
inadequate voting technology, poorly developed procedural rules, and a
lack of uniform standards all combined to send the once infallible American democracy into a state of emergency. 1 The world watched as Florida
officials drifted from crisis to crisis in the days following the election. The
world was still watching when several state and federal lawsuits failed
to resolve the dilemma or determine the presidency. Finally, the Supreme Court ended the fiasco with a pragmatic, yet much criticized decision.2 Not only did the 2000 U.S. Presidential election embarrass the
nation in front of the watching world, it also served to infuriate and further alienate many Americans from the electoral process.
The majority of the problems behind the 2000 presidential debacle
were caused by a long-ignored aspect of electoral governance - the
method by which the people cast their ballots. 3 Effectively, this administ Director, Electoral Law Project, Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, University
of New South Wales. I wish to thank Professor George Williams and Graeme Orr for their
support and encouragement. This research was made possible by a grant from the Australian Research Council and the Electoral Council of Australia.
1. For a complete review of the 2000 U.S. Presidential election, see CNN: 2000 Election Archive, <http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/> (accessed Jan. 15, 2003).
2. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). For detailed discussion on the litigation and Supreme Court's decision, see Dan Lowenstein, Lessons from the FloridaControversy, in Realising Democracy: Electoral Law in Australia (Bryan Mercurio et al. eds.
Federation Press (forthcoming) 2003); Richard Posner, Florida2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 4048 (2000).
3. Voting technologies have only seriously been studied in the 1950s and 1960s, when
lever-arch machines became popular, and again in the 1980s, when punch cards and optical
scan machines became operational. See Stephen Ansolabehere & Charles Stewart III, Voting Technology and Uncounted Votes in the UnitedStates, Cal Tech-MIT Voting Technology
Project 1, 3 (Sept. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Cal Tech-MIT Report].
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trative aspect of the electoral system has been overlooked and allowed to
decline into a state of extreme disrepair without anyone taking notice.
When officials were forced to take notice, two major problems emerged.
First, a poorly designed ballot system served to confuse a significant portion of the voters, causing many voters to cast their ballots for an unintended candidate or unintentionally spoil their ballots. Second, a poorly
designed ballot paper made it difficult to determine the intent of the
voter and a poorly designed tabulating process led to electoral officials
making such determinations (wben possible) without a standardized system to guide their determinations. These two factors combined to wreak
havoc on the electoral system and reduce the reliability and integrity of
the American democracy.
Even more demoralizing to the American democracy, since the 2000
Presidential election, we have been bombarded with reports of lost, stolen, bought, and misplaced votes. 4 Similarly, reports of potential voters
being turned away from the polls or otherwise disenfranchised from the
electoral process have become increasingly common. The fact that in the
2002 Florida Congressional election, just two years after the presidential
debacle, Broward County misplaced 103,222 votes should be highly worrying. 5 While many Americans believe that these reports only pertain to
Florida, the reality is that reports of electoral misgivings are not isolated
and encompass every state in the nation. In fact, the entire electoral
system is in such a state of decline that an estimated 2.2 million votes
6
have gone uncounted in each of the last four presidential elections.
The American democracy depends on full and free elections, but as it
stands today, voters have no real assurance that their votes are properly
cast or that their votes will not get lost or uncounted for any of a number
of reasons. The system by which we exercise our democratic right has
repeatedly proven itself to be untrustworthy and dysfunctional. As a result, voter confidence in the system is at an all-time low. The time is now
ripe to thoroughly investigate alternative methods of casting ballots as a
way to restore our fledgling democracy. 7
4. Whether in print or on the Internet, reports of electoral malfeasance are now common. See What Really Happened, Election Fraud 2002, <http://www.whatreallyhappened.
comlvotefraud.html> (accessed Sept. 29, 2003).
5. Scott Wyman, Broward officials misplace 103,222 votes, but outcomes are unchanged, S. Fla. Sun-Sentinel (Nov. 7, 2002).
6. Ansolabehere, supra n. 3, at 11.
7. In response to the 2000 electoral crisis, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act
(HAVA), which authorized $2 billion in 2003 and $4 billion over three years to assist the
states in improving voting technology. The 2003 Bush budget only sought $500 million for
the project, but Congress reached an agreement to provide $1.5 billion in funds to implement the HAVA in 2003. Rob Ritchie, Fair Elections Update, <http://www.fairvote.org/
e news/030214.htm> (Feb. 14, 2003).
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Using the Internet to assist the electoral system is one possible option that is currently being considered to remedy many of the defects
within the electoral process. Internet voting has the capacity to enhance
the electoral process in numerous ways, such as preventing over-votes,
reducing invalid votes, assisting non-English speakers with voting, allowing disabled Americans to vote without assistance, increasing participation in the electoral process, and eliminating the tons of waste
generated from unused ballot papers. The endless capabilities of Internet voting do come with a caveat: Internet voting is untested and less
transparent than traditional voting.
This article evaluates the ability of Internet voting to improve the
electoral process by comparing it against traditional methods of voting
currently used. In order to clearly understand electoral issues, Part II
briefly describes the criteria needed in order to conduct a successful election. Part III introduces and defines the different forms of "Internet voting" used in the context of this article. Part IV introduces and analyzes
some major faults with the election system and evaluates the promise of
Internet voting as a solution to these faults. Part V reviews and substantially discredits the perceived problems with implementing Internet voting. Part VI puts forward several proposals leading to the gradual
introduction of Internet voting into the electoral landscape.
II.

CRITERIA FOR A SUCCESSFUL ELECTION

In order to ensure free and fair elections, any new voting measure
must satisfy certain fundamental standards of elections. When reading
the list of fundamental standards detailed below, it is important not only
to consider whether Internet voting (or any new election system) meets a
substantial portion of the criteria, but also how the new system relates
and interacts with other aspects of democracy such as access by demographic groups, election logistics and administration, deliberative and
representative democracy, and the political culture of elections.8 The criteria for a successful election are set out below:
-Authentication and Eligibility - only authorized and eligible voters should be allowed to cast ballots;
-Accuracy -votes should be recorded and counted correctly, to ensure that the will of the people is represented;
-Uniqueness - voters should only be allowed to cast one ballot each;
-Integrity - votes which are forged, modified or deleted should be
detected;
8. For instance, a move to increase security in the voting process would increase the
costs of running an election and reduce voter convenience and flexibility. Likewise, a move
to encourage participation could lead to a reduction in authentication and verifiability.
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-Verifiability and Auditability - verification that all the votes have
been accounted for in the final tally and that reliable and authentic records exist to that effect;
-Reliability - election systems should ensure against the loss of any
votes, even when faced with electoral failures;
-Secrecy and Non-Coercibility - voting is done in secret without
voters ever having to reveal how they cast their respective ballots;
-Flexibility - election equipment should allow for a variety of platforms and technologies and should be accessible to all voters, including those with disabilities;
-Convenience - voters should be able to quickly cast their ballot
without undue delay;
-Certifiability - election systems should be regularly tested and
certified to ensure against electoral failure;
-Transparency - voters should possess a general understanding of
the voting process and should not be deceived into voting a certain
way; and
-Cost-effectiveness - election systems should be affordable while
still being efficient and effective. 9
III.

WHAT IS INTERNET VOTING?

The term "Internet voting," or "online voting," is not clearly defined.
"Internet voting" is an online form of "electronic voting" (e-voting). The
term "Internet voting" has became synonymous with remote Internet
voting when in fact it could mean any form of voting on the Internet,
whether at home, the polling station, voting kiosk, or any other place in
which the Internet is accessible. As the benefits and burdens of Internet
voting depend upon which version of Internet voting is on offer, this article will differentiate between and clarify which form of Internet voting is
being discussed.
Confusion also exists within the term "electronic voting." While the
term can be used broadly to describe any form of mechanical voting, such
as punch card machines or voting at the polling station using a computer
terminal or any similar touch-screen or mouse activated machine which
stores votes and may or may not have the ability to tabulate votes, these
forms of e-voting are not online forms of voting, meaning the systems are
9. This criterion was compiled from a White House commissioned report operated by
the U.S. National Science Foundation, Internet Policy Institute and the University of Maryland. The report was the product of an October 2000 workshop, where political scientists,
computer scientists, election officials, and others analysed and assessed the feasibility of
Internet voting and identified research priorities for the advancement of Internet voting.
Internet Policy Institute, Report of the National Workshop on Internet Voting: Issues and
Research Agenda 11, <http://e-voto.di.fc.ul.pt/docs/InternetVotingReport%20-%2OMarch%
202001.pdf> (2001) [hereinafter IPI Report].
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not connected to Internet lines and there is no chance of outside interference (e.g. hackers). This article will not discuss offline e-voting, instead
this article focuses on Internet-based, online voting.
With this background in mind, electoral commissions considering
implementing online e-voting have two very distinct forms to consider.
A.

REMOTE INTERNET VOTING

Modern life has wholeheartedly embraced the accessibility, relative
low cost, and seemingly endless capabilities of the Internet. Home computer ownership and Internet use have risen exponentially in recent
years,10 and more than 160 million Americans now do a variety of timeconsuming tasks, such as banking, shopping for clothes or groceries, or
paying bills online in a matter of seconds."1 Moreover, federal, state,
and local governments now rely on the Internet to provide constituents
with essential governmental information and interactive services.
Despite the inclination to treat our electoral democracy with judicious care, voters are calling for more convenience to the voting process. 1 2 Remote Internet voting would provide the extra convenience, as it
would allow voters the opportunity to cast their ballots in the comfort of
their own homes, at an Internet caf6, or anywhere else the Internet is
accessible. Proponents of remote Internet voting envision voters logging
onto the voting Web site via secure means, establishing their identity,
and then voting in a real-time transaction at any time convenient to the
voter on Election Day. This formula is simple to understand and similar
to any other web-based transaction. However, remote Internet voting
will be the most difficult form of e-voting to implement, as cost, security,
and policy-related issues must be adequately addressed before its full13
scale implementation.
10. The World Wide Web expanded from 50 servers in 1993 to over 100,000 in 1997.
See Ari Staiman, Shielding Internet Users from UndesirableContent: The Advantages of a
PICS based Rating System, 20 Fordham Intl. L.J. 866, 874 (1997). As of March 2003, the
Internet had over 649 million users. Global Reach, Global Internet Statistics, <http:ll
www.glreach.com/globstats> (accessed June 20, 2003).
11. See Global Reach, Details of country/language analysis, <http://global-reach.biz/
globstats/details.html> (accessed June 20, 2003).
12. A recent study revealed sixty-one percent of younger voters are "enthusiastic"
about voting online. See Six Out of Ten Young Voters Say Yes to Internet Voting, Business
Wire (July 23, 1999); Voters Overwhelmingly Support Internet Voting, Business Wire (Mar.
1, 2000) (reporting a poll conducted by Votehere.com indicated ninety-four percent of the
3,638 polled indicated a desire to have Internet voting offered as a voting option in the
future).
13. Remote Internet voting depends on a number of factors outside the electoral officers' control, such as whether the voter's operating system is supported by the proper
voting and encryption software and whether the voting system is able to recognise that the
person attempting to vote is a legitimate voter who has not previously voted in the election.
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Several binding and non-binding elections have trialed remote Internet voting recently, with the 2000 Arizona Democratic Primary garnering the most considerable media attention. In that election, voters
could voluntarily choose to cast their ballots online or by traditional
means. The trial, trumpeted as "the first-ever, legally-binding public
election over the Internet," succeeded in increasing voter interest and
suffered no breach of security or electoral failure. 14 This landmark trial
should be commended for putting Internet voting on the agenda and for
starting the Internet voting revolution.
The U.S. Department of Defense Federal Voting Assistance Program
also developed and trialed an Internet voting system for military personnel located outside the U.S. 1 5 While the trial took some years to develop
and the cost incurred proved considerable, 16 the end result was a successful trial at the 2000 Presidential election.' 7 The government has already announced that it will expand this trial in the 2004 general
election and provide Internet registration and voting for overseas citi8
zens as well as military personnel.'
The Alaska Republican Party also conducted a straw poll over the
Internet in 2000. Alaska is a sparsely populated state where travel in
the winter is severely limited, making it difficult for a number of potential voters to get to a polling station to cast their ballots. Such a situation almost certainly dissuades people from voting and lowers the overall
participation rate of Alaska. The Republican Party recognized this problem and decided to trial Internet voting as a possible way of increasing
voter participation. The trial, conducted without the support of the
14. John O'Looney, The Implications ofInternet Voting, <http://www.govtech.net/maga
zine/gt/2000/sept/Internet/implications/phtml> (accessed May 19, 2002).
15. Voters were covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act
(42 U.S.C. § 1973). Eligible voters must have had legal residence in one of the counties
allowed to participate in the trial (each State was limited to only one county participating
in the trial measure to limit risk exposure in the event of system failure).
16. The trial proved costly for a number of reasons. First, the Defense Department
funded the complete development of the e-voting system. Second, the Defense Department
had to organize and train participants and state and local election officials for the trial. In
this regard, support from individual states was crucial, as each of the four states involved
amended its legislation to allow the 250 trial lists to cast their ballot over the Internet.
Third, the Defense Department provided each voter with an individualized PIN and CDROM to guarantee that each web browser being used by the voter had adequate security
and technical compatibility capabilities.
17. The Federal Voting Assistance Program (the agency which administered the trial)
report evaluating the trial is available at <http://www.fvap.gov/voi.html>.
18. The Federal Voting Assistance Program is developing a system called the "Secure
Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment" to implement these measures for the 2004
elections. At present, fourteen states are participating in the project. See Digital Government Program, Military Voting Goes Online, <http://www.diggov.org/news/stories/2002/
0402/0402military-holland.jsp> (accessed Jan. 15, 2003).
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Alaska Division of Elections, proceeded without delay or any security
problems.19
Internet trials are also occurring outside the U.S., with European
countries, such as Switzerland 20 and the United Kingdom (UK),2 1 having trialed remote Internet voting in binding elections and Estonia al22
ready having successfully implemented remote Internet voting.
Several other countries around the world are also studying Internet voting due to its efficiency, speed, and ability to increase voter
23
participation.

19. The Republican straw poll allowed voters in three territories to cast their ballots
over the Internet either remotely or at the polling station. Sam Diaz, Arizona Democrats
Can Vote Online in Primary,Knight-Ridder Trib. Bus. News (Mar. 3, 2000).
20. In order to combat falling turnout, the Swiss canton of Geneva recently staged its
first Internet election. Voters praised the system for its efficiency and accuracy. Alison
Langley, Geneva Suburb Casts Ballots on the Internet in Test Project, N.Y. Times (Jan. 12,
2002).
21. In May 2002, the British government provided £3.5 to undertake a series of initiatives aimed at improving electoral efficiency, encouraging voter participation and widening
the range of voting methods. The trials allowed electorates to conduct voting via the Internet, text messaging or offline e-voting at the polling station in thirty local electoral districts. See Electoral Commission, ModernisingElections, <http://www.electoralcommission.
gov.uklabout-us/modernisingelections.cfm> (accessed Jan. 9, 2003); Britain Experiments
With Early, High-tech Voting, AP World Politics (April 25, 2002). Prior fears of security
breaches and increased electoral fraud appeared unfounded, as the system functioned
properly and there were no technical glitches or security breaches. In addition, e-voting
improved the accuracy and efficiency in the ballot tabulation process and voters rated the
system highly. The primary aim of the trial, to establish the reliability and security of the
e-voting systems and to build public confidence in the new technologies, achieved its objectives. See Online Voting Fraud Warning, <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/hi/English/uk-poli
tics/newsid_1799000/1799883.stm> (accessed June 9, 2002); Wendy Brewer, E-voting Has a
Long Way to Go: Election Results Mixed for Alternative Voting Methods, PC Advisor (May 3,
2002). In May 2003, the UK expanded the trials by allowing over 1.5 eligible voters in
forty-two electorates the opportunity to vote using the new voting methods. The trial, costing £18 million, chiefly aimed to improve voter participation and enable the UK to have an
online general election by 2006. See Matthew Tempest and Martin Nicholls, E-Vote Early,
E-Vote Often, The Guardian (April 17, 2003).
22. Dermot McGrath, Europeans Eye E-Vote Eventuality, Wired News (Apr. 22, 2002);
See Matthew Tempest, Reformers Skeptical of Online Voting, The Guardian (Jan. 7, 2002).
23. Several European countries, including Sweden, Ireland, Holland, and Norway are
studying Internet voting with a view to implementing it in future elections. In addition,
Germany announced it will have online voting by 2006 and France, Italy, and Spain have
planned e-voting trials in forthcoming referenda and elections. Eileen McGann, Is Internet
Voting Fair?, Network World 61 (June 26, 2000). A number of these initiatives were
funded by the European Union. Cybervote Project, Vote in Total Confidence Via the Internet, <http://www.eucybervote.org/press_release.html> (Oct. 13, 2000).
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INTERNET VOTING AT THE POLLING STATION

While the long-term promise of remote Internet voting is great,
many view another Internet-based option, Internet voting at the polling
station, as the more viable short-term option. Internet voting at the polling station is similar to the processes voters know and trust. The voter
would appear at the polling station on the requested day and have his or
her name marked off the role as normal before retiring to a booth which,
instead of being equipped with traditional voting apparatus, would have
a terminal connected to a closed network server at which the voter could
cast a ballot electronically. The computer would then forward the votes
24
via modem to a central location for counting and collating.
Internet voting at the polling station is practical and appealing, as it
offers greater convenience and efficiency over traditional voting while
also allowing election officials to maintain control over the computer operating system as well as monitor the physical surroundings of the
venue, making the security risks more manageable and the risk of electoral failure significantly less than with remote Internet voting. This control would also provide as much guarantee to authentication and privacy
as traditional paper voting and, as the voting software would not allow
multiple votes, eliminate the possibility of anyone voting more than once
under the same name.
While voters would not have the convenience of voting away from
the polling station, they would get numerous benefits from Internet voting at the polling station, such as fast and simple voting as well as
quicker, more accurate election results. Election officials would also benefit from Internet voting at the polling station from the added efficiency
and diminished administrative burden. Officials could also use Internet
voting at the polling station as an evolutionary system towards remote
Internet voting.
Internet voting at the polling station has been successfully trialed in
non-binding elections by numerous software companies. The most nota26
25
ble private software companies include VoteHere.net, Election.com,
24. The vote forwarding process would occur either during the election or after polling
closes. For instance, the system could "store and forward" the voting data by secure means
to the central server during the election to prevent flooding and data loss if the communication lines fail. Conversely, the computer could record and store votes in a localised server at
each polling station before sending the final count via secure connection to a central server.
25. VoteHere.net conducted a trial in the State of Washington at the 1996 Presidential
election. The trial aimed to introduce the concept of e-voting to the electorate. After voting
in the binding election, voters could elect to cast their non-binding vote at an Internet voting stations. The e-voting system was well received by the majority of those who participated. VoteHere.net also performed the Alaska straw poll and has tested its technology at
polling stations in Washington, Iowa, Illinois, and Virginia, with very favorable responses
from voters who have tried the system. Margaret Johnston, Remote Alaskans to Vote Using
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and Safevote.com.
In November 2000, Safevote.com conducted one of the most comprehensive mock elections in Contra Costa County, California. Safevote.com
invited voters who cast their pre-poll vote to cast a mock vote via the
Internet at the same location. Voters participating in the trial were given
a PIN 2 7 and once the system was activated, used a mouse to select their
preferred candidates. Once voting was completed, the votes were stored
on a completely separate system to prevent the voter's identity from be28
ing traced from his or her vote.
In addition, Safevote.com encouraged people to hack into the system
and even published the hardware and software details on the Internet,
hosted an attack help page, and created an attack hotline to encourage
hackers to attempt to crack the security code. The system remained secure throughout voting. Safevote.com attributes their record of security
to the use of a constantly changing IP address used to connect the system
to the Internet, which made flooding the system and hacking difficult, if
not impossible.
Recently, several companies have started conducting shareholder
votes via the Internet on a wide range of topics, and several private companies have been given an opportunity to showcase their voting
software. 29 While public elections attract more publicity and passion and
have to comply with more rigorous standards, private elections conducted over the Internet contribute to the development of better voting
software by allowing companies to assess and correct performance after
each vote and are a useful platform for election officials to trial Internet
voting software.

Internet, Network World Fusion (Jan. 24, 2000). Votehere.com also conducted the recent
UK trials, and it has agreed to provide Internet voting facilities to Sweden, Finland, Germany and other European countries. See VoteHere PartnersWith Votia to Offer Online Voting in Sweden and Other European Countries, <http://www.votehere.com/news.htm> (Jan.
9, 2002).
26. Election.com managed the election for the Arizona Democrats, the board of directors of ICANN (Internet Cooperation for Signed Names and Numbers), the Australian
NRMA Board of Directors and many other elections. Election.com, Press Releases, <http:l!
www.election.com/us/pressroonpressrel.htm> (accessed June 24, 2003).
27. The PIN numbers were calculated using voter's date of birth and the type of ballot
requested. The voter verification system checked the PIN against the database and enabled
the voter to verify their vote before submitting it for tally.
28. This security and privacy measure is common among all the major e-voting
software companies.
29. Derek Dictson & Dan Ray, The Modern Democratic Revolution: An Objective Survey of Internet-Based Elections, White Paper, <http://www.securepaper.votingpaper.com>
(Jan. 2002).
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WHY ADOPT INTERNET VOTING

Recent elections have underscored the failure of the current system
to protect critical elements of an electoral process. The current system
has proven ineffective at preventing or detecting forged, modified, or deleted votes, and loses, misplaces or otherwise leaves millions of votes uncounted in each presidential election. Moreover, millions more
Americans are prevented from voting for any number of reasons, including faulty prison records or improperly mailed registration cards. These
problems signal a major systemic failing of our electoral system and have
correctly led many Americans to question the reliability and accuracy of
the current voting system.
This section introduces and analyses some major faults with the current election system and evaluates the promise of Internet voting as a
solution to these faults. The section is divided into four distinct sub-sections, each offering another failing of the current system and argument
in favor of Internet voting as a more accurate and reliable method of
voting.

A. Low

PARTICIPATION RATE

In 2000, just over half of the eligible voters in the U.S. actually cast
a ballot in the presidential election. In an election literally decided by a
few hundred votes, this statistic rightly casts doubt upon the democratic
nature of the government.
More worrying is the fact that the 2000 election statistics are not an
aberration. In fact, the 2000 election followed the four-decade old trend
of declining voter participation. 30 The declining rate of participation has
finally emerged as the paramount concern among both academics and
policymakers and several recent studies have concluded that the problem of falling voter participation may warrant the implementation of In31
ternet voting.
Advocates of Internet voting feel the technology removes the two
main obstacles to voting - convenience and mobility3 2 - and will particu30. Wired News, Report Pans Internet Voting 10, <http://www.wired.com/news/print/
0,1294,42229,00.html> (March 6, 2001). The need to increase participation in the electoral
process is evidenced by the fact that ten million fewer Americans voted in 1996 than in
1992, resulting in participation that was its lowest since 1920 when the 19th Amendment
gave women the right to vote.
31. EPI report, supra n. 9, at 24; California Secretary of State, CaliforniaTask Force on
Internet Voting 36, <http://www.ss.ca.gov/executive/ivote/> (accessed May 7, 2002) [hereinafter California Task Force on Internet Voting].
32. The U.S. Census bureau concluded voter apathy and a lack of voter convenience
were the main reasons behind the low turnout. A recent study also places some of the
blame for low participation on poor accessibility of polling stations (long commutes and
inconvenient locations), which must adhere to the stringent requirements of the ADA. See
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larly increase participation among the traditionally under-represented
groups, such as younger voters, elderly voters, and disabled voters.3 3 Remote Internet voting would also particularly suit voters called out of
town at the last minute, who instead of being disenfranchised, would be
able to exercise their civic duty.
The U.S. is not the only country experimenting with Internet voting
as a potential solution to voter apathy, as the UK is also currently studying and trialing the technology with a view towards increasing voter participation. 3 4 Both the U.S. and UK have also instituted other reforms to
increase participation, such as simpler registration procedures, liberalizing the absentee ballot requirements, and extending voting times, but
these reforms have had little or no effect on voter participation. 3 5 As a
result, both nations have indicated a willingness to substantially invest
in and trial Internet voting as a possible cure to the modern day lethargy, and leading British parliamentarian Sir Robin Cook believes implementing Internet voting at the next general election is a way to
"enfranchise" disillusioned voters back to the democratic process. 3 6
Internet voting has successfully generated election-time interest and
attracted voters to the polls. 37 For example, despite the fact that Vice
James G. Gimpel & Jason E. Schuknecht, Politicalparticipationand the Accessibility of the
Ballot Box, <http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Links/gimpell.pdf> (forthcoming in Political Geography, 2003). The study found turnout is heaviest in densely populated areas and lightest in suburban areas (due to long commutes, busy schedules and inconvenience polling
places). Id.
33. A Federal Elections Commission report shows that people aged 18-24 are the least
likely to vote. In 1996, less than one-third of 18-24 year olds voted in the presidential election. Federal Elections Commission, Voter Registration and Turnout in Federal Elections
by Age 1972-1996 <http://www.fec.gov/pages/agedemog.htm>. The Public Policy Institute
of California reports that 73 percent of 18-24 year old Californians either often or sometimes have access to the Internet and e-mail, making it likely that participation will rise
under Internet voting. California Task Force on Internet Voting, supra n. 31, at 43.
34. Britain managed only a fifty-nine percent turnout for the last general election,
thought to be at its lowest point since universal suffrage was introduced. Jackie Ashley, Sir
Robin Cook, Leader of the House of Commons, Plans to Make UK First to Vote on Internet,
The Guardian (Jan. 7 2002).
35. While these measures serve to reduce the level of security and integrity of the election, they have failed at attracting the disenchanted voter to the polls. See e.g., a January
28, 2003, election in Orange County, California, where 24,258 of the 35,646 ballots cast
(sixty-eight percent) were from absentee voters (the highest rate of absentee voters ever in
a California election); unfortunately, only 12.9 percent of the 277,007 registered voters participated in the election. Orange County, Orange County Registrarof Voters, <http://www.
oc.ca.gov/election> (accessed Mar. 10, 2003).
36. Ashley, supra n. 34.
37. On the other hand, some commentators suggest Internet voting may only be a
short-term solution to voter apathy and that its implementation could be perceived as undermining civic participation and the legitimacy of the act of voting, actually depressing
long-term participation. IPI, supra n. 9, at 25.
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President Al Gore had already secured his party's nomination, the 2000
Arizona Democratic primary, which allowed voters to cast their ballots
over the Internet, saw voter participation rise 600 percent over the prior
election, with forty-one percent of the 86,907 votes cast via the Internet.
Internet voting also appears to have assisted the Reform Party in increasing their 2000 Presidential candidate nomination total.38 In addition, Internet voting is also credited with raising voter participation from
fifty percent to sixty-four percent in the recent legally binding referen39
dum in Switzerland.
In addition, computerized voting has proved popular with mainstream voters, with statistics showing voters who have used both remote
and polling station Internet voting systems in the U.S. and UK overwhelmingly rate the process very highly and uniformly praise on the
ease of use, speed, and assistance provided by the system. 40 Computerized voting has also been praised by non-traditional voters, such as nonEnglish speakers and disabled voters. 4 1 This praise stems from the fact
that computerized voting's flexible format can accommodate more voters
than traditional voting methods. For example, while traditional voting is
limited to the amount of voters it can accommodate (due to issues such as
printing costs), computerized voting can accommodate as many different
languages as required without adding significant cost to the system.
Moreover, computerized voting is also well received by disabled voters
worldwide, including blind voters, who are often unable to cast a ballot
without assistance from electoral officials under traditional voting.
38. Farhad Manjoo, Wired News, Reform Voting Evokes E-Votes, <www.wired.com]
news/politics/0,1283,37964,00.html> (accessed Aug. 3, 2000).
39. SiliconValley.com, Swiss Village Holds First Internet Vote, <http://www.silicon
valley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/4985064.htm> (Jan. 24, 2003).
40. See Farhad Manjoo, The Case for Electronic Voting, <http://www.wired.comlnews/
politics/0,1283,40141,00.html> (accessed Nov. 14, 2000) (reporting Riverside, California's
offline e-voting recently received a ninety-nine percent user-approval rating); NOP Research, Public Opinion in the Pilots, <http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/templates/
search/document.cfm/6267> (accessed Oct. 21, 2002) (reporting forty-five percent of those
polled thought that e-voting made the process of voting "better"); ACT Electoral Commission, Electronic Voting Trial 'A Success,' <http://www.elections.act.gov.au/adobe/2001Elec
tionReviewComputerVoting.pdf> (accessed June 28, 2002) (reporting eighty-nine percent of
voters found e-voting easy to use and understand). In addition, in a non-binding trial operated by Safevote.com, 100 percent of the 300 people who voted using the system found it
easy to use and understand, including an eighty year old woman who had never used a
computer and a drunken man, who stated, "If I can do this, anyone can." Farhad Manjoo,
Ballots Need an Upgrade - Duh!, <http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,40078,00.
html> (accessed Nov. 10, 2000).
41. Thad Hall, LA Story: The 2001 Election, <www.reformelection.org/data/reports/lahall.pdf> (accessed Jan. 5, 2003) (reporting countless non-English speaking Americans in
Los Angeles required assistance to vote with a paper ballot).
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B.

EQUALITY ISsUES

While critics claim that the implementation of Internet voting may
violate equality laws, deny or unfairly disadvantage some groups in the
community the right to equality and equal access, further dilute the minority vote, and increase the "digital divide," this section will show not
only that Internet voting meets the equal rights standards but also that
the current system of voting violates the equality requirements and denies some groups in the community the right to vote and that Internet
voting will allow more people to vote and grant the equal franchise to
many communities that are without equal representation under the current system. The section will further show that leaving the current voting system unchanged will only increase the "voting technology divide"
42
and promote the unfair treatment of disabled and minority voters.
1.

Minority Voting Under the Present System

The statistics from the 2000 Presidential election are clear: minority
votes are more likely to be miscounted, misplaced, disregarded, or otherwise uncounted than that of Caucasian voters. This inequality is primarily due to the fact that minority precincts cannot afford to purchase
state-of-the-art voting machines and are forced to rely on outdated voting technology to record and count the vote. 43 For example, the Florida
county of Gasden, the only Florida county where black voters make up a
majority of the electorate, is a poor county that uses outdated voting
technology. As a result, in the 2000 election, voters in Gasden had a
sixty-eight times greater chance of having their votes deemed invalid
than in adjoining Leon County, a county that could afford to purchase
44
the latest voting technology.
This scenario of one county using unreliable voting technology while
another county in the same state uses a more reliable method of recording and tabulating votes creates a "voting technology divide." In the 2000
election, over 2000 Gasden County votes were deemed invalid in an election decided by only 537 votes, leading one to question whether differences in voting technology have the potential to alter state-wide election
outcomes. 4 5 As only nine states voted with uniform or near-uniform technology, this gap is not peculiar to Florida. Instead, the "Voting technology divide" is present in almost every state in the nation.
42. To the author's knowledge, the term "voting technology divide" first appears in
Paul Schwartz, Voting Technology and Democracy, 77 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 625 (2002).
43. A Modern Democracy That Can't Count Voters, L.A. Times Al (Dec. 11, 2000). As
each county has to fund the cost of voting equipment, the poorer counties cannot afford
$5,000 on proper technology. Schwartz, supra note 42, at 3-644.
44. Id. at 625-26.
45. Id.
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Many post-2000 investigations reveal problems with uncounted ballots are particularly concentrated in disadvantaged communities. For
example, it has been found that in "many black precincts in Chicago, one
of every six ballots in the presidential election was thrown out" but that
the uncounted rate for suburban precincts was virtually nil. 4 6 Moreover,
as many as one in three votes were uncounted in black sections of Jacksonville, Florida, a rate 400 percent above the uncounted rate in
predominantly white precincts. 47 Black voters in Ohio also appear to
have been disadvantaged, with a vast majority of the uncounted votes in
that state being from poorer, predominantly black precincts. 48 These are
but a few examples that prove the "voting technology divide" is real and
significantly disadvantaging minority voters.
Perhaps the most convincing proof of the "voting technology divide"
is the results of a study conducted by Rep. Henry A. Waxman, the ranking member of the Committee on Government Reform. The study, commissioned to examine whether voting technology can reduce the rate of
uncounted ballots, even more clearly illustrates the existence and harm
of the "voting technology divide."4 9 Detroit was chosen as the case study
location for a number of reasons, including the fact that it recently made
a substantial effort to reduce uncounted ballots and the fact that it has
one of the highest minority populations (African-Americans make up
seventy-six percent of the population) and the highest poverty rate of any
U.S. city (thirty-two percent of the population live below the poverty
50
line).
Detroit upgraded its electoral system in 1998 and replaced punchcard voting with an optical scan system that allowed voters to view and
amend their ballots before leaving the polling booth. The change resulted
in the overall percentage of uncounted votes in Detroit decreasing from
3.1 percent of the ballots cast in 1996 to 1.1 percent of ballots cast in
2000 (in other words, from over fifty percent above the national average
in the 1996 election to almost fifty percent below the national average in
2000).51 The city saw an across the board reduction in the number of
uncounted ballots, with every precinct reducing its percentage of un46. John Mintz & Dan Keating, A Racial Gap In Voided Votes; PrecinctAnalysis Finds
Stark Inequity in Polling Problems, Wash. Post (Dec. 3, 2000).
47. John Mintz & Dan Keating, FloridaBallot Spoilage Likelier for Blacks; Voting Machines, Confusion Cited, Wash. Post (Dec. 3, 2000).
48. Darrel Rowland, Many Votes Uncounted in Ohio's PoorAreas, Columbus Dispatch
(Dec. 17, 2000).
49. Election Reform in Detroit: New Voting Technology and Increased Voter Education
Significantly Reduced Uncounted Ballots, Minority Staff Special Investigations Division,
Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives. Prepared for Rep.
Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Member (Apr. 5, 2001).
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id. at 1.
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counted votes from 1996 to the 2000 election and some precincts reducing their uncounted rate from over seven percent in 1996 to less than one
percent in 2000.52
Another study, conducted by the Cal Tech-MIT Voting Technology
Project, also revealed the true effects of the "voting technology divide."
The study found that voting equipment has strong and "substantial effects" on the rate of uncounted votes, with the difference between the
best performing voting equipment and the worst performing voting
equipment being as much as two percent of ballots cast. As five of the
last twenty presidential elections have been determined by less than two
percent of the vote, this finding casts doubt on the reliability of many
53
past election results.
Both studies confirm the existence of a "voting technology divide"
and the direct correlation between voting equipment and the rate of invalid votes. These studies provide clear evidence that if we ignore this
problem and keep the current system of voting, minority vote dilution
and other equality problems will only increase.
2.

Minority Voting and the Internet

The "digital divide" has emerged as the primary federal constitutional issue regarding Internet voting. In electoral terms, the fear is that
giving voters another means of voting will increase voter participation
among one group (people who have Internet access) while voting participation rate remains static in other voting groups (non-Internet users).
While increasing voter participation is one very persuasive reason for
adopting Internet voting, the concern is that this "digital divide" will result in greater voter participation among educated and wealthier voters
at the expense of less educated and poorer voters.
Proponents of this argument claim that the implementation of Internet voting would violate the 15th Amendment's guarantee that "the
right to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any state on account of race or color." 54 They base this argument on the
assumption that minority voters do not have as much Internet access as
Caucasian voters. 5 5 While the constitutional argument is tenuous under
52. Id.
53. Ansolabehere, supra n. 3, at 28.
54. U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1.
55. An additional argument could be made under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which
states in pertinent part: "To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is
not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be denied the right to
vote... because of his failure to comply with any test or device in any State.... ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(b). Internet voting could possibly violate the Act by broadening the access of voting
to one segment of the population who has access to a "device" that is unavailable to other
segments of the population. As Internet voting produces a far lower rate of invalid votes
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any circumstances, the statistics regarding Internet use do not necessarily substantiate the claim that minorities use the Internet substantially
less than white voters.
A National Telecommunications & Information Administration
(NTIA) study shows that the perceived digital divide between white and
minority voters, educated and uneducated voters, and wealthy and poor
voters to largely be misstated. The study revealed that Internet access
among Caucasians (29.8 percent), black-Americans (25.5 percent), and
Asian/Pacific Islanders (thirty-six) are relatively equal. The study found
that two groups Native Americans (nineteen percent) and Hispanics
(12.6 percent) clearly lag behind the other groups. 5 6 It also appears that
the so-called digital divide among those highly educated and those without an education is also illusory, as 53.1 percent of those with only a high
school education regularly use the Internet. Moreover, income level also
appears not to be a determining factor, with forty-one percent of adults
with an income under $15,000 and sixty percent of adults with incomes
57
of $15,000-$49,000 using the Internet.
In addition, the government has devoted large amounts of resources
to programs aimed at narrowing the "digital divide" and all indications
are that the programs appear to be working, with minority participation
on the Internet rapidly growing.5 8 Furthermore, during the 2000 Arizona Democrats Internet trial, Internet voting not only succeeded in a
record setting total turnout, but the feared effect of the digital divide
proved illusory. In fact, Native American turnout was four times that in
previous elections, despite the fact that only nineteen percent of Native
59
Americans have regular Internet access.
when compared to traditional forms of voting, people without access to Internet voting
would be deprived of equality in the voting process. If it can be shown that a certain segment of the population is disadvantaged by this disparity, then the system of Internet voting could be challenged as offending policies of equality and equal access. Regardless of the
rate of invalid votes, remote Internet voting could add an extra incentive encouraging those
groups with Internet access to vote, which could be seen as a fundamental inequality, as
voting results would be affected by the change in voting patterns of one voting demographic. While this argument, and the argument in the preceding paragraph, would carry
weight in a system relying totally on remote Internet voting, election officials should avoid
fundamental inequities by having remote Internet voting as an alternative to, and not a
replacement of, polling station voting.
56. Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1131, 1163 (2000).
57. William E. Kennard, New Approaches to Minority Media Ownership: Columbia Institute for Tele-Information, Columbia University: Foreword: Equality in the Information
Age, 51 Fed. Comm. L.J. 553, 554 (1999).
58. Id. at 555.
59. Andre M. Chernay, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Analysis of
Internet Voting Proposals, <http://www.mcgeorge.edu/government law-and-policy/califor
niainitiative-review/reports/ccglp cir reports-internet voting.htm> (accessed June 30.
2003). Seventy-eight percent of the Native American community in Apache County partici-
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Surprisingly, the Arizona Internet election was almost halted before
it began due to a lawsuit filed by the Voting Integrity Project (VIP). The
VIP argued the election denied equal access and discriminated against
certain voters because Internet voting would last four days instead of the
usual one day period, but the judge questioned the digital divide data
and stated the availability of county owned computers with Internet access for voters' use were enough to deny the injunction. 60 The Justice
Department supported the ruling and stated that Arizona's proposed implementation of Internet voting had no inherent conflicts with minority
61
groups.
The Constitutional issues regarding equality standards do not seem
insurmountable. The Department of Justice has stated that the constitutional arguments are not valid so long as sufficient Internet access is
provided to the public. 6 2 Therefore, as long as polling booths remain
open to accept voters, Internet voting should not be viewed as disadvantaging a particular voting group. Moreover, when compared with
the inequality stemming from the current system, a system which required the use of third-world election monitors in the 2002 election to
stem the uncertainty lingering from the 2000 election, the potential
63
problems of Internet voting seem minor.
3.

DisadvantagedVoters and the Internet

Another equality-based argument often used against Internet voting
is that some voters will not be able to keep up with or understand the
technological advancement. While it is true that every potential voter
could not vote electronically, the traditional methods of voting currently
exclude many Americans from voting without assistance. Internet voting would finally allow those voters the right to cast their own ballots.
Under the current system, a large portion of disabled voters, including blind voters and those with limited arm movements, are denied the
right to vote in secret due to the limited number of voting methods offered. A properly designed e-voting machine at the polling station would
pated in the election, as did 53.1 percent of the Native American community in Navajo
County. Id.
60. VIP v. Fleisher, No. CIV 000109 Phx. Pgr (D. Ariz. Jan. 21, 2000).
61. Chernay, supra note 59. Interestingly, VIP's argument contradicts their position in
a paper entitled, "Are We Ready for Internet Voting," which argues voter convenience
would lower participation among Internet users, thereby serving not to decrease minority
voting power but actually increasing the power. See O'Looney, supra n. 14.
62. Brian Krebs, Net Voting Standards Proposed, <http://www.computeruser.com/
newstoday/00/02/29/news8.html> (Feb. 29, 2000).
63. Group to Monitor Fla. Election, NY Times (Oct. 15, 2002) (stating that at the behest of the black community, Miami-Dade hired monitors used in developing democracies
to ensure a proper vote in the 2002 elections).
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finally grant those voters the opportunity to cast their ballots in secret.
Trials of various forms of online and offline e-voting systems in numerhave been
ous countries, including the U.S., Australia, UK, and Japan,
64
universally praised for their ease of use and guidance.
Without action on the part of the legislature and electoral administrators, the threat of legal action on behalf of disabled voters is a real
and present possibility. While some American states already enable disabled voters the opportunity to vote in secret without assistance, a number of states continue to deny this right to its disabled citizens. In doing
so, these states are risking the cost and embarrassment of a lawsuit, as
the fact that some disabled voters are unable to vote without assistance,
and thereby denied their right to vote in secret, even though technology
exists to allow those voters to vote in secret, may violate federal or state
anti-discrimination statutes.
The issue was first litigated in the District of Columbia (DC) under
the Americans with DisabilitiesAct 1990 (U.S.) (ADA). 65 The case settled
before trial, however, so no authoritative ruling on the issue was made.
But the settlement signified a complete victory for the plaintiffs, with the
electoral commission agreeing to purchase and make available a number
of disabled-accessible e-voting machines at each polling station. 6 6 Since
that litigation, other states having voting methods inaccessible to blind
or visually impaired voters have come under attack from disabled groups
such as the American Association of People with Disabilities (AAPD) and
other groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).
While several states have acted on their own accord and provided funding for the purchase of accessible voting equipment, other states have

64. But see e.g. Colin Barry, et al, Electronic Voting and Electronic Counting of Votes: A
Status Report, at 12, 14, <http://www.eca.gov.au/reports/electronic.voting.pdf> (accessed
May 15, 2002) [hereinafter Status Report]; IPI Report, supra n. 9, at 25 (advancing the
proposition that poll site e-voting allows more people with disabilities access to voting than
any other voting method). Ardis Bazyn of the California Council of the Blind stated "We
give touch screen voting machines an "A"for giving blind and visually impaired voters an
independent and private way to vote. With electronic voting, we have the ability to hear
our vote choices read through a headset, and cast a vote and confirm using a keypad. Voters can also enlarge the print on the screen to vote." California Voter Empowerment Circle,
Press Release, July 2003 (on file with author).
65. The U.S. has an estimated 54 million disabled citizens, with 24 million of voting
age. Disabled U.S. Voters Have Their Say, <http://www.accessibility.com.au/news/internat/
usyoters.htm> (accessed Mar. 11, 2003).
66. American Association of People with Disabilities, AAPD Plaintiff in a Landmark
Lawsuit Against the District of Columbia That Has Just Been Settled, <http://www.aapd.
(accessed Jan. 5, 2003)
com/dvpmainvotemachines/landmarksettledcvotemach.html>
[hereinafter AAPD Plaintiff]; Perry Bacon, Optical-ScanBallot Debuts for Primary;WriteIn Count Will Not Benefit, Washington Post T03 (Sept. 5, 2002).
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67
fought the issue all the way to the courthouse.
For instance, one blind voter in Maryland filed a compliant after
election officials refused to allow him the use of a specially designed
Braille-type template in the 2002 congressional elections. The complaint,
filed in conjunction with the ACLU on behalf of 20,000 blind or visually
impaired people in Baltimore County, MD, alleges violations of both the
Constitution and the ADA. 6 8 Litigation and settlement negotiations remain ongoing.
Class action suits have also been filed in Florida, Pennsylvania and
Texas, and although the plaintiffs have been met with limited judicial
success, the overall outcomes of the litigation have been a positive step in
gaining equal standing for disabled voters. For instance, Pennsylvania
officials are currently negotiating a settlement, which, similarly to the
DC settlement, will see election officials supplying e-voting systems to
aid disabled voters. Moreover, even though the plaintiffs in Texas lost
their case at the appellate level, the state subsequently passed a law requiring that any new voting system purchased must make secret ballot
provisions available for blind and physically impaired voters. Thus far,
the only state refusing to capitulate to the disabled voters' demands is
Florida. Litigation remains ongoing in Florida,6 9 and even though a new
state statute requiring that any new voting system purchased must be
accessible to visually and physically disabled voters, state officials refuse
to settle the case until the federal government provides the promised
funding to aid in the transition to e-voting.
The clear trend in the U.S. indicates that states will have to provide
disabled-accessible voting options or else face the cost and, more importantly, the embarrassment and electoral backlash of defending the discriminatory voting system in court. States are starting to realize the

67. Kris Wise, Voting System to Change: County Moves Ahead Without Guarantee of
Federal Funds, Charleston Daily Mail (Mar. 3, 2003) (stating West Virginia has allocated
$3 million of the $10.5 million federal grant for election reform to be used to purchase
handicapped-accessible voting machines). See also Bryan Mercurio, Discriminationin Electoral Law: Using Technology to Extend the Secret Ballot to Disabled and Illiterate Voters,
28 Alternative L.J. 272 (2003).
68. Poole v. Baltimore County & Md. Bd. of Elections, No. 02-3610 (D. Md. Election
Day 2002).
69. AAPD v. Hood, No. 3:01-CV-1275-J-21TJC, (M.D. Fla. 2002). The Florida litigation
was filed in Duval County, where there are currently only three disabled-accessible machines in the county for use by the 40,000 disabled voters in the county. It is estimated that
a complete fit-out of disabled accessible machines in Duval County would cost only
$U.S.900,000. Alan Fisk, People with Disabilities Are Suing States on Voting, <http://
www.aapd.com/dvpmain/elreform/suestatesvoting.html> (April 18, 2003) [hereinafter People with Disabilities];See Cathy Willoughby, Hanging Chads Could Prove Costly, <http://
www.advertiser-tribune.com/text/n030603a.html> (Mar. 6, 2003) (quoting the Chairman of
the Senecca County Board of Elections (Mr Wayne Hoover) as stating "(new voting methods) have to meet all ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act) requirements").
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importance of this issue and, as we have seen, are beginning to voluntarily mandate the purchase and availability of accessible voting equipment. This trend is only likely to increase.
C.

RELIABILITY AND INTEGRITY

Critics of Internet voting often belabor the perceived security concerns with Internet voting, such as the potential of ineligible voters casting ballots, voters fraudulently casting more than one vote, or hackers
erasing or changing election results. 7 0 Not only is that tactic unproductive, but the criticism is unsubstantiated and the comparison illusory.
The risks of Internet voting cannot be simply stated, but must be compared to the current methods of voting available. When compared, it becomes clear that the current system is not a 100 percent reliable, trusted,
and accurate electoral system, but a system that revealed its true identity in the 2000 Presidential Election, an election which brought us lost
ballots, pregnant chads, confusing butterfly ballots, dubious hand recounts, and impartial electoral officials making important systemic decisions. 71 The current system is depriving millions of Americans of the
right to vote or have their vote count equally under our democracy. For
that reason, we must study other methods of voting in the hope that they
can improve upon our decrepit, ill-administered, and failing system.
1.

Voting Technology: Current System

It can be said with substantial certainty that the current voting
technologies do not produce accurate results. The cause of this problem
is debated, but it appears a majority of the problems associated with the
election process are not the result of fraud or corruption but are the result of long-term neglect and mismanagement. 72 The electoral system
has never received an appropriate amount of funding and consequently,
has become outdated and unreliable. The decentralized nature of electoral administration has also played a large part in spoiling the system,
with a divide clearly present between wealthy counties and their poorer
counterparts.
The recent Cal Tech-MIT study found that punch cards perform the
70. Lee Dembart, Are Internet Ballots a Vote-Fixers Dream, Int'l Herald Tribune (Apr.
28, 2003).
71. See e.g. Mike Clary, Jeb Bush Testifies on Hands-Off Role in Election, L.A. Times
A20 (Jan. 12, 2001); A Modern Democracy, supra n. 43.
72. This claim is substantiated by a recent study that shows evidence of fraud is minimal. The study recommends, among others, that electoral authorities upgrade technology
and require ID to be shown at the election booth. Lisa Minnite & David Callahan, Securing
the Vote:An Analysis of Voting Fraud37-38, <http://www.demos-usa.org/demos/pubs/Secur
ingTheVote.pdf> (last updated May 20, 2003).
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worst among electoral technologies. 73 The study reported, "voting technologies are not neutral with respect to recording votes cast by voters on
Election Day" and concluded that "lowering the rate of error attributable
to voting technologies will improve the legitimacy of American elections,
at home and abroad." 74 These statistics reveal the wide degree of methods available to voters and also show the varying degree of certainty allowed by our electoral administrators. Unfortunately, since voting
administration is still left in the hands of state and local officials, the
majority of the precincts relying on poor voting technology are in
predominantly minority areas.
While federal voluntary standards for voting equipment were
adopted in 1990, existing equipment is exempt; therefore, several poor
precincts still use antiquated, unreliable voting methods. 75 Thus, even
though the National Bureau of Standards (now the National Institute of
Standards and Technology) recommended in 1988 that punch-card voting be abandoned, many jurisdictions took no action and punch-cards remained in over 500 U.S. counties.
Even though punch-cards were the source of much of the trouble in
Florida 2000, they remain in use today in many counties. 7 6 In fact, six
different varieties of punch-cards are used across the country's 3,141
counties and 10,000 local jurisdictions, as are five different types of
lever-arch machines (including the 38 year old model needing 27,000
parts to operate as used in New York City),7 7 ten varieties of optical
scanning systems, six types of touch-screen voting, and numerous other
forms of voting technologies in various jurisdictions. In the 2000 elections, U.S. electoral jurisdictions relied on twenty-eight different voting
methods, with 37.4 percent of the precincts using some form of punchcards, 24.7 percent using optical scanners, 21.8 percent using lever-arch
machines, 7.3 percent using touch-screen technology, and three percent
using traditional paper ballots. 78 Not only does the lack of standardization confuse the voting public, but it also results in a different percentage
of cast and uncounted ballots in each jurisdiction, potentially violating
the right of each voter to have their vote count equally.
73. Ansolabehere, supra n. 3, at 27-28. Over 3.7 million ballots were cast with punch
card voting in the 2000 Florida election. Schwartz, supra note 43, at 634.
74. Ansolabehere, supra n. 3, at 27-28.
75. "Long-term neglect introduces so many errors into voting and counting ballots that
it is impossible to know after an election exactly what the totals are and how many people
may have been robbed of their votes." A Modern Democracy, supra n. 43.
76. Schwartz, supra n. 42, at 634.
77. In 1998, eight percent of the 6,221 lever-arch machines in New York malfunctioned
on Election Day. A Modern Democracy, supra n. 43.
78. Michael A. Hiltzik & Greg Miller, Fiasco Reveals a Ballot System Full of Holes,
L.A. Times, Al (Nov. 11, 2000).
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Perhaps more troubling is the performance of some of these voting
methods. The 2000 Presidential election revealed the true extent of the
damage that flawed ballots and voting methods can do to an election. In
Palm Beach County, Florida, faulty ballots appeared to be the reason
that over 19,000 votes were deemed invalid. Moreover, faulty ballots
have also been blamed for Reform Party candidate Pat Buchanan receiving an inordinately high number of votes in that heavily Democratic
county. 79 Statistical analysis estimates that 2,865 of the 3,407 votes cast
for Buchanan were actually intended to be cast for Vice President
Gore.8 0 In an election decided by around 1,000 votes, an election, which
ultimately decided the next president, one can clearly link the faulty ballot to the ultimate outcome of the election.8 1
Prior to the 2000 election, the low cost of punch card voting helped
keep it popular with electoral administrators despite its propensity for
inaccurately rejecting votes where the back of the "chad" is left hanging
instead of being fully punched out. In such cases, even though the intent
of the voter is blatantly clear, the machine rejects the vote as invalid
and, in the event of a recount, partisan officials are left to debate the
82
legitimacy of the ballot.
Not even offline e-voting machines have escaped the voting technology criticism brought about by the 2000 electoral failure.8 3 For instance,
e-voting machines were initially blamed for leaving uncounted votes in
the 2002 Florida congressional elections, but election officials quickly realized that the majority of errors were actually caused by workers either
forgetting to plug the storage disk (the disk that records and stores the
vote totals) into the computer at the start of voting or forgetting to take
the voting cartridge out of the computer after the close of polls (leaving
the votes from those machines uncounted). Eventually, untrained workers and election administrators were appropriately blamed for the er79. The ballot design resulted in several lawsuits by those claiming to be deprived of
the right to vote. CNN News, Congressman Says 19,000 Votes Invalidated; 2 Suits Filed
Over Irregularities, <http://www.cnn.com/2000/allpolitics/stories/ll/09/palm.beach.votes>
(Nov. 9, 2000).
80. See Indiana University Web site of Professor Burt Monroe, located at <http://www.
indiana.edu/-playpol/pbmodel.pdf> (accessed January 31, 2003); Online Journalism R., A
statistical analysis of the Florida Vote, <http://www.ojr.org/ojr/ethics/1017962655.php>
(Nov. 9, 2000).
81. CNN News, supra n. 79.
82. Optical scan machines also face a similar problem, as these machines require voters to carefully fill in ovals, arrows or boxes and the machine rejects votes which are Xed or
checked instead of filled. While some counties allow for election workers to enhance the
original in an attempt to clarify the intent of the voter, such interference by partisan election officials can raise the appearance of impropriety.
83. The HAVA allocates more than $1 billion for the purchase of e-voting systems, but
numerous technologists have questioned the swift move towards the new voting method.
Sam Lubell, To Register Doubts, Press Here, N.Y. Times (May 15, 2003).
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rors. Despite their performance in recent elections,8 4 some information
technology experts assert that offline e-voting machines are unsafe and
85
vulnerable to malfunction.
The above analysis of the current voting technologies reinforces Cal
Tech-MIT's poignant conclusion that "Americans' votes are not all
counted the same." 86 Internet voting at the polling station and remote
Internet voting will help correct the inequality, which inevitably stems
from the disjointed nature of the American electoral process.
2.

Internet Voting Can Improve the Accuracy of the Vote

Prior to 2000, the accuracy of election results was rarely investigated. But the 2000 presidential election changed the course of American
electoral history. It is estimated that faulty voting equipment and the
lack of guidance and instruction to non-English speaking voters, resulted
in approximately two million lost or uncounted ballots in the last presidential election.8 7 Moreover, several incidents of minorities being intimidated or otherwise discouraged from voting, incorrect lists of ineligible
voters, and polling stations either opening or closing at incorrect times
served to disenfranchise even more voters.8 8 In total, it is estimated that
six million voters who intended to vote in the 2000 election but could not
vote due to voting machine failure, inaccessibility of polling stations, or
incorrect registered voting lists.8 9 Since 2000, we have been bombarded
with reports of lost, uncounted, or misconfigured votes, of people being
84. Kellie Patrick, CartridgeProblem Casts Pall on Voting, Sun-Sentinel 1A (Mar. 12,
2002). While e-voting machines have generally performed without interruption, there have
been instances of malfunction. Id. However, the majority of the malfunctions have been
attributed to human error. Id.; Machines lose 294 early votes - -Softwareglitch means Wake
voters will get re-vote, N.C. News Observer (Oct. 31, 2002).
85. Dan Keating, New Voting Systems Assailed, Wash. Post A12 (Mar. 28, 2003) (reporting that the e-voting systems operating in Maryland "performed flawlessly" and that
voters were "happy with how they operated").
86. Ansolabehere, supra n. 3, at 29.
87. A Modern Democracy, supra n. 43. Voters of non-English speaking backgrounds
have uniformly praised e-voting's ease and guidance. Kathay Feng of the Asian Pacific
American Legal Center summed up their position by stating "[vioters who cannot read English well - including seniors and immigrants who may never have used an ATM - have
tried these machines out and love them. Electronic voting allows voters to choose their
language from the first screen and to see the instructions and their ballot choices entirely
in their language of choice. For diverse California, millions of voters will be fully enfranchised because of this bilingual option." California Voter Empowerment Circle, supra
n. 64.
88. For instance, many voters in Cleveland's predominantly minority east side were
disenfranchised when the city relocated the polling booth without notifying voters. A Modern Democracy, supra n. 43.
89. Ansolabehere, supra n. 3, at 3; Voting Reform Projects Creep Forward, Daily J. 7
(July 12, 2001); The Center for Voting and Democracy, newsletter, <www.fairvote.org>
(Feb. 14, 2003).
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disenfranchised or otherwise impeded from voting, and of partisan electoral officials deciding the legitimacy of a vote without a strict standard
on which to base their decision. There can be no doubt that the current
system disenfranchises Americans.
Internet voting has the ability to correct some of the injustices currently embedded into the system and substantially improve the electoral
process. For instance, Internet voting eliminates the human error or
prejudice associated with the current electoral system. The 2000 Presidential election so vividly reminded us that partisan electoral officers
often act in a partisan manner. The inconsistent, unbalanced system of
recognizing and discounting invalid votes seen in that election could not
be repeated in a computerized system of voting. 90 Moreover, a fully functional Internet voting system is unquestionably accurate, thereby reducing the instances of losing candidates questioning the count, requesting a
recount or otherwise lengthening the process in close elections.
As well as removing bias and human error from the process of determining voter intent, Internet voting adds recognizable standards to the
recording and tabulating process. Both polling station and remote Internet voting can enhance the recording and tabulating stage of an election for a number of reasons. First, computerized voting is easy for the
voter to understand, resulting in a substantially lower rate of invalid
votes. E-voting's rate of invalid votes is consistently under one percent,
compared with the large rate of invalid votes that exist under other
forms of voting (consistently around five percent). 9 1 This low rate of invalid votes is due to the design of e-voting systems, which attempts to
ensure that the voter properly casts his or her ballot by leading the voter
through the process and confirming that the selections the voter made
are the ones he or she intended to make.9 2 Moreover, e-voting systems
allow voters to check their ballot before sending it through (i.e. placing it

90. The seemingly standard-less recount resulted in both candidates gaining a considerable number of votes, with Vice President Gore receiving more votes than now-President
Bush. CNN News, supra n. 79.
91. For example, in Riverside California, where touch-screen voting is used, the rate of
invalid votes is negligible, compared to their former system using the punch-card system,
which resulted in a large number of votes for multiple candidates. Manjoo, supra n. 40.
The offline Australian trial resulted in an invalid rate of .57 percent, compared with 4.32
percent of paper votes being deemed invalid. Australian Dept. of the Parliamentary Library, Electronic Voting in the 2001 ACT Election, Research n. 2001-02, No. 46 (June 18,
2002) ("Parliamentary Report").
92. Some voters often use the ballot as a form of protest, so the system must be designed to ensure the ability to cast an invalid vote remains possible so as not to curb political speech.
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in the box).9 3
Internet voting also has the ability to tabulate and report election
results immediately following the close of the polls. As the media increasingly use technology and opinion polls to predict election outcomes
before their conclusion, the importance of quick election results have
never been so crucial. However, short of a ban on such "speech," the electoral system risks being compromised by overambitious news reporters if
it cannot quickly tally and report the voting results. 94 By allowing the
media the opportunity to predict election results (regardless of their accuracy), the system risks diminishing the importance of voters in the pacific time zone, who may be discouraged from going to the polls and
voting when the Presidential election appears to already have been decided. The electoral system cannot ignore this reality and must actively
attempt to eliminate this growing problem.
Another reason to favor the implementation of Internet voting is the
current system's failure to authenticate a substantial portion of the votes
due to increased absentee voting and relaxed identification qualifications
when registering to vote or casting the ballot. 9 5 Internet voting has the
ability to reverse this trend and properly authenticate votes and guarantee that a voter does not cast multiple ballots.
Absentee voting is extensively used in every state to supplement polling station voting, with Oregon entirely replacing traditional voting
with a system entirely based on postal voting. 96 In absentee voting, elec93. This mechanism for checking the ballot could simply be done by a pop-up box appearing which states something of the following nature, "You voted for X. Are you sure you
want to vote for X? If Yes, click ENTER. If no, click BACK."
94. In Canada, a British Columbia provincial judge ruled section 329 of the Canada
Elections Act, which prohibits reporting vote tallies before polling closes, an unconstitutional infringement of the freedom of expression clause in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the equivalent to the American Bill of Rights). Terri Theodore, B.C. Judge Strikes
Down Portion of Elections Act, The Globe and Mail (Jan. 29, 2003).
95. Six states (Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming)
currently allow registration on Election Day and, in an effort to increase participation, several other states are considering such a move. Dana Damico, Registrationon Day of Election Considered Backers Say Plan would Draw More Voters, Winston Salem J. 1 (Apr. 17,
2003). Other states having lax registration requirements often cannot guarantee the authenticity and integrity of their vote. For example, Alaska has 38,209 more registered voters than voting age population and an estimated twenty percnt of Indiana's registered
voters are counterfeit and fraudulent. Moreover, in North Dakota, recreational vehicle
owners who use the state as a tax haven list campgrounds as their address while also being
registered to vote in their "actual" home state. Andrew Nelson, Voter Requirement OK'd,
Associated Press State & Local Wire 1 (Feb. 27, 2003).
96. While no other state has abandoned traditional voting, counties in several states
are considering complete absentee voting for local elections. For example, Pasadena, CA is
considering an "all-mail" election, see Pasadena, City of Pasadenaand Pasadena Unified
School District Primary Municipal Election <http://www.ci.pasadena.ca.us/cityclerk/elec
tion/2003defaultsecondary.asp> (Mar. 4, 2003).
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tion officials send blank ballots by unregistered mail to the known address of registered voters. Not only does this result in a number of votes
being sent to outdated or incorrect addresses, but it also provides easy
access for thieves to steal votes from letterboxes or for voters to sell or
otherwise allow a proxy to vote in their place. Electoral officials can
neither guarantee that the blank ballots reach the proper voter, nor can
they guarantee the authenticity of the returned ballot as being from the
proper registered voter. In fact, it is estimated that in the 2000 Presidential Election "more than 36,000 of (Oregon's) 1.5 million voters may have
mailed in ballots that were signed by someone else." 97 Numerous other
states have also recently admitted that serious reliability problems exist
within their respective absentee voting systems. 98 Moreover, political
parties in some states, most notably Texas, hire so-called "Vote-whores"
to either steal, pay, or do favors for registered voters in exchange for that
person's ballot. 99 Furthermore, voters in many states are not required to
show identification before being given a ballot and allowed to vote at the
polling station, thereby casting doubt on the authenticity of the final
election result.10 0
Opponents of Internet voting cite voter privacy as a reason to oppose
the technology, pointing to the fact that outside influences, such as
friends, co-workers, family or work superiors, have the ability compel or
coerce a voter to vote in a certain way. In fact, it is not hard to imagine a
situation where a person voting remotely feels compelled to vote a certain way due to influences of other people in the area where the person is
voting. It is also not hard to imagine the even more frightening scenario
where voters are voting under duress or coercion, such as a supervisor
urging the employee to vote in a certain way with threat of sanction.
While such unfortunate situations cannot be prevented in remote Internet voting, they should not be reasons to oppose the voting method.
The same troubling situation is currently present in every state, where
voters using the absentee ballots face the exact same pressure and possible coercion that remote Internet voters would face. Postal voting is accepted by the vast majority of voters and electoral officials, yet it is
97. A Modern Democracy, supra n. 43. An emerging, and yet to be resolved, related
problem is that of what to do with existing absentee ballots when a candidate dies or otherwise withdraws from the election before Election Day.
98. See e.g. the recent Washington Secretary of State report outlining the problems
with that states absentee voting system. Office of the Secretary of State, Election Procedures Review of King County State of Washington 2002, <http://secstate.wa.gov/elections/
pdf/kingcounty.pdf> (last updated Sept. 24, 2003).
99. A Modern Democracy, supra n. 43.
100. States attempting to pass legislation requiring voting-day identification have been
met with strong opposition. While the resistance attempts to minimize voter disenfranchisement, it may result in votes being cast by someone other than the proper registered voter.
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proven to be victimized by widespread electoral problems, such as lack of
verification, undelivered ballots, and vote fraud. 1 1 Not only does absentee voting escape this line of questioning, but due to its convenient nature, it also enjoys widespread electoral use.
While Internet voting at the polling station would not radically depart from traditional polling station voting (it would only provide as
much or as little authentication protection as the jurisdiction currently
has in operation under its traditional voting methods), remote Internet
voting could provide more authentication and protection than traditional
polling station voting through its various security measures, including
encryption technology (the scrambling of information during transmission), electronic signatures (the use of passwords and/or personal identification numbers ("PIN,") and biometrics (i.e. digital signatures or digital
scan technology) to verify a voter's identity and maintain the integrity of
10 2
the data during transmission.

D.

COST-EFFECTIVENESS

Since the American electoral system is a disjointed unity among the
federal, state, and local levels of government, calculating the actual costs
of a nationwide presidential election is not a simple task. However, considerable analysis of the 2000 election, including Presidential and Congressional balloting, estimate that the elections cost over $300 million in
total. This figure, which does not include certain fixed cost items, including voting equipment, would be apportioned between the federal, state,
10 3
and local authorities.
Through a combination of lower administrative and training costs
and a willingness of software companies to offer package pricing, In04
ternet voting has the ability to significantly lower the cost of elections.1
101. Oregon laws allow party volunteers to go door-to-door to collect ballots or to drive
voters to a postal box to deposit their votes. The recent Oregon election was also plagued
with other problems, such as ballots being returned by the post office for insufficient
postage.
102. In the Department of Defense trial, voters logged onto the designated Web site and
entered their PIN, which had been provided for the trial. Once securely logged onto the site
(through PKI technology), voters selected their preferred candidates and completed the voting process. After voting had completed, local voting officials in every applicable county
logged onto the site and entered their PIN to retrieve the votes. Officials decided that
allowing the system to tally the votes would have been too big a step to introduce in the
trial. Therefore, the trial focused on system and security aspects of e-voting. Election officials printed a non-identifying ballot for each voter for the purposes of tallying votes.
103. Ernest Hawkins, Cost and Finance of Elections, <http://www.hss.caltech.edu/-vot
ing/hawkins-present.pdf> (Mar. 30, 2001) (paper presented to the Cal-Tech-MIT/Voting
Technology Conference).
104. Kevin Coleman, Internet Voting: Issues and legislation, Congressional Research
Service Report for Congress, Order Code RS20639 at 2 (Nov. 7, 2001).
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While the author believes polling station voting should always remain a
voting option, 10 5 the number of polling stations needed during an election could be significantly reduced if a substantial proportion of the voting population chose to cast their ballot remotely, thus reducing the
number of polling staff and administrative costs for the electoral commission. Therefore, Internet voting could lower government spending on
voting infrastructure and personnel-related costs.
Moreover, remote Internet voting would dramatically reduce, if not
eventually eliminate, the need for absentee ballots. This change would
substantially reduce the burden of organizing, posting, securing, and
counting absentee ballots, as well as reduce the costs of printing and
postage. As absentee voting results in several tons of wasted and unused
paper, a change to Internet voting would have the ancillary benefit of
helping the environment.
Even simply allowing Internet voting at the polling station would
ease the administrative burden election officials currently face, as officials would no longer have to carefully supervise the safety, security, and
transport of the ballots and instead could concentrate on other pressing
matters that inevitably arise on Election Day. Internet voting would
also reduce the threat of lost or uncounted ballots, as well as eliminate
much of the paper-voting by-product. Counties currently print ballots for
all eligible voters, yet voter participation hovers around fifty percent;
thus, counties are forced to dispose of the unused ballots after the election. Not only does this waste have a negative effect on the environment,
but the printing of unused ballots is also a substantial monetary waste
that costs taxpayers money.
While one would assume that developing an Internet voting system
would be a time consuming and expensive venture (with initial outlays of
developing or purchasing a reliable remote e-voting system, hiring technical experts, and training staff among the many necessities), Internet
voting software companies have competitively priced their products with
traditional forms of voting. 10 6 A comparison between a typical voting
105. For a similar view, see California Internet Voting task Force, supra n. 31, at 1;
Status Report, supra n. 64, at 16.
106. The Reform Party only paid $1 million for Internet voting during their 2000 Presidential nomination process, a figure substantially lower than traditional election costs.
Farhad Manjoo, Reform Voting Evokes E-Votes, <www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,379
64,00.html> (Aug. 3, 2000). While Internet voting cost the Swiss canton of Geneva Swiss
slightly more than traditional voting (500,000 Swiss francs instead of 150,000), the figure
is expected to decrease with usage. Regardless, these figures are drastically less than some
early estimates at the cost of implementing Internet voting, which put the figure as high as
$20-$50 million per county. Lance J. Hoffman, Internet Voting: Not Ready for Prime Time
(Yet) 4, <http://www.cpi.seas.gwu.edu/library/presentations.php> (accessed Jan. 15, 2003).
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precinct and a precinct implementing Internet voting illustrates how Internet voting can be more cost-effective than traditional forms of voting.
For the average voting precinct, the rural Missouri county of Greene
will be used. Greene County spent approximately $60,000 for printed
ballots, supplies and delivery in its 1998 presidential primary elections.
This figure does not include the cost of the tabulation machine or initial
purchase of the voting system.' 0 7 In contrast, the city of Oconomowoc,
WI, (currently considering implementing both remote and polling station
Internet voting for local elections) has tentatively contracted with Elec
tion.com to administer its city elections. Election.com would charge only
$16,600 to develop and monitor the system, train city officials, provide
108
technical support, and certify and evaluate results.
Each county must conduct detailed studies to calculate the short and
long-term costs of Internet voting to ascertain if the system is cost-effective to implement. However, each county must also realize that, while
retaining the current voting system will be the cheaper in some cases,
the detriments of keeping a failing system could soon far outweigh the
short-term cost savings.
V.

DISPELLING THE MYTHS

Millions of Americans use the Internet daily to conduct important
personal, business, and financial transactions. Several key industries,
such as banking, healthcare, and government, also transport private information in a secure Internet environment on a daily basis. Critics,
however, often cite potential security concerns as a reason for opposing
Internet voting. This section will analyze concerns regarding the credibility and integrity of Internet voting and will not only prove those concerns to be, for the most part, unwarranted, but also that Internet voting
is in fact more secure and reliable than numerous forms of voting currently used.
107. When the costs of purchasing election equipment are added to the costs, Internet
voting is even more attractive and cost-effective. Traditional election equipment costs between $2,000-$11,000 per unit, while a personal computer capable of performing the tasks
required for Internet voting can be purchased for less than $1,000 dollars. Further substantiating the claim that Internet voting will reduce the costs of administering elections are
the statements of Alfred Charles, Internet Voting Task Force Chair and Assistant Secretary for e-Government for the California Secretary of State, who stated that while Internet
voting would cost approximately $6 per vote and traditional voting methods only range
between $3-5 per vote, the savings would be realized in the cost of the voting equipment.
Chernay, supra n. 59.
108. Amy Rinard, City May Conduct Elections on Internet, <http://www.jsonlin.com
news/wauk/mar03/122619.asp> (last updated Mar. 3, 2003).
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ELECTORAL SECURITY

Internet voting systems are designed with numerous security measures to protect the integrity of the election. For example, Internet voting
at the polling station can provide measures such as swipe bar-coded
cards to activate the computer or biometric identification readers to prevent multiple voting. Of course, while security measures can prevent
some voter fraud, they cannot prevent all forms of voter destruction.
While the risk of voter sabotage is slight, destructive acts, such as a
voter smearing gel on the screenlkeyboard/mouse in an attempt to disable the machine or alter votes, could burden election officials and volunteers and may even delay voting.109
Some commentators have convinced the public that computerized
voting is unsuitable for the voting process because destructive voters
hell-bent on sabotaging the election could tamper with or otherwise disable voting machines, but further study regarding potential tampering
reveals this argument to be a red herring, as no electoral system is safe
from the intentional destructive acts of votes. Indeed, a voter could
smash or otherwise disable an e-voting machine, but a voter could just as
easily light a match and drop it into the ballot box and destroy paper
votes. While both are possible, neither is likely.
Not only is such behaviour not expected of the average voter, but in
the event of tampering on a computerized voting machine, it would be on
such a small scale as to not affect the results of the election. 1 0 Moreover,
Internet voting allows voters the opportunity to check which candidates
they have voted for before registering the vote and correct any errors
without losing or altering a single vote. Therefore, if the system were to
incorrectly indicate the chosen candidate, the voter would immediately
become aware of the problem and report it so that it may be corrected.
Critics have also called the integrity of remote Internet voting into
question, pointing to the fact that remote Internet voting does not allow
electoral officials to verify that the remote voter is actually the person
supposed to be casting that ballot."' On closer inspection of this argu109. In Italy, authorities recently foiled the mafia's plan to control the election result by
having voters use their 3G mobile video phones to send pictures of their completed ballots
for inspection before casting their votes. BBC News UK Edition, Mafia Turns to 3G Video
Phones, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/l/technology/3033551.stm> (May 21, 2003).
110. For example, critics often claim that e-voting will experience problems such as
screen failure due to repeated finger jabbing or barcodes failing to activate machines and
while these problems could occur, they are rare and easily discoverable. In most elections,
problems the machines have usually have been corrected within minutes of discovering the
problem and very rarely does a machine ever have to be decommissioned during an
election.
111. See e.g. Cynthia H. Craft, Making Sure that California's Votes Are Actually
Counted, L.A. Times, Opinion, Part M, 1 (Dec. 17, 2000) (California Secretary of State, Bill
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ment, one again sees its flaws when compared to the current system of
voting. As stated earlier, every state extensively uses postal voting to
supplement polling station voting (with Oregon exclusively using postal
voting to replace traditional voting). The postal voting process is highly
insecure and often leads to blank ballots not reaching the intended voter
for a number of reasons, including theft. Electoral officials cannot guarantee that the blank ballots reach the proper voter nor can they guarantee that the authenticity of the returned ballot as being from the proper
registered voter. Not only does this disenfranchise the legitimate voter,
but it also threatens the integrity of the entire electoral process. The
integrity of the current absentee process is also threatened by politically
affiliated "vote-whores," who as explained earlier, attempt to buy or steal
112
ballots in order to gain a political advantage for their party.
However, the absentee voting process is not the only threat to the
integrity of American elections. Many states have no requirement that
voters show identification before being given a ballot and being allowed
to vote at the polling station. This allows voters to assume another identity in order to cast more ballots in favor of their preferred candidate.
Remote Internet voting can drastically reduce, if not eliminate, the
occurrence of such fraudulent voting practices by requiring identification
particulars from voters when they log on to cast their ballot. While no
voting system can provide a 100 percent guarantee against all forms of
fraud or irregularities, Internet voting attempts to reinstate integrity in
the voting process through a number of security measures.
These security measures could be implemented in a number of ways.
One such method would require the voter to encrypt the ballot with a
secret key before sending it to the election office. The voter would send
the ballot, with their blind signature, to a verifier who verifies that the
person is a registered voter. If found to be valid, the ballot would be
returned to the voter, who would remove his/her identification signature
and send the ballot, with the encrypted signature of the validator, elecJones, stated, "[we] don't have the ability to verify who a person is on the other end of the
PC or the Internet").
112. Other forms of bribes are also commonplace; for instance, a radio personality in
Canton, Mississippi was recently investigated after providing a half-bottle of gin in return
for votes in the 2002 Democratic primary. Radio PersonalityAccused of ExchangingGin for
Votes, Associated Press (Apr. 18, 2003). Vote hauling has also become a big issue. Vote
hauling occurs when supporters pay people to drive other voters to the polls. In one instance, a candidate paid 1,217 people $50 for the service. Incredibly, this service is legal in
some states. See Rick Hansen, Vote Buying, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1323 (2000). Moreover, California allows payments for convincing people to vote, but state law prohibits the payment
being conditioned on voting for/against a certain candidate. This practice has been put to
use by the Democratic Party, who targets poor neighborhoods with coupons for free donuts.
In Alaska, candidates have been known to use free gasoline coupons as the voting sweetener. Id.
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tronically to the electoral office. The electoral office would then publish
the names of Internet voters for those voters to verify that for all names
that are listed, they were the ones who actually voted. The voter then
sends the encryption key to the electoral office and the electoral office
publishes the encrypted ballot and key for vote verification.
Another possible solution would be to have voters sign up to vote
remotely before the election. The electoral office could send those voters
a disk containing a cryptographic key and an affidavit, which the voter
would sign and return. 113 The encrypted key would only be activated
after the affidavit is checked against the voters name on the roll. The
actual vote would also be encrypted with a different key to generate an
anonymous e-mail.
Yet another alternative to authenticating votes may be to introduce
a voter's smart card, which carries the holder's particulars on a
microchip in the plastic card and can be used to verify a voter's identity
both at the polling station as well as remotely. Such a system has
worked successfully in Finland; however, in the short-term, it is impractical to expect that voters have card scanners connected to their computers. 1 14 Other possible identification techniques, such as biometric
authentication devices and cryptographic devices, also suffer the same
deficiency.
Unlike the current system in place in many jurisdictions, the above
examples would also prevent voters from voting twice and reduce the
instances of fraud, as the security system would not allow the voter's
identification information to be opened and accessed more than once.
The above examples also prove that it is feasible to provide voters the
chance to cast their ballot from anywhere in the world while also surpassing the level of authentication and uniqueness currently available in
many current voting technologies.
Due to the problems with postal voting and people voting at the polls
without providing identification, one can feasibly argue that Internet
voting is actually safer and more secure than postal voting and some polling station voting. This assertion is backed by the California Internet
Voting Task Force, which reached the conclusion that "it is technologically possible to utilize the Internet to develop an additional method of
voting that would be at least as secure from vote-tampering as the cur' 15
rent absentee ballot process in California."
113. The disk would be secure so that it could not be numbered to track the voter and
how the voter cast their ballot.
114. Symposium, Technology and Administrationin Election Procedure, SOU 2000:125,
5.2 (2000) (Swedish Ministry of Justice) [hereinafter "Swedish Report"].
115. CaliforniaInternet Voting Task Force, supra n. 31, at 1.
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B.

AUDITABILITY

Many Americans have been led to believe that the paper trail for
verification, commonly called the "audit trail," is removed from all forms
of computerized voting. The removal of such auditability is troubling for
a number of reasons, not least of which is the inability of electoral officials to verify that all the votes have been accounted for in the final tally.
However, the widely held view that computerized voting completely
116
removes the "audit trail" from the voting process is misleading.
While it is true that Internet voting trusts computers and voting
software to properly record, forward, and tabulate the votes, software
companies insist that polling station e-voting systems prevent against
vote loss. Further, an audit trail is created, by sending and burning
every transaction on the server to a CD, which would serve as a back-up
in the event of a hardware problem or total malfunction. 117 The companies also assert that their voting systems utilize an algorithm that mixes
up the order in which ballots are stored on the server, thus ensuring that
the vote of each voter cannot be traced back to that person and preserving the secrecy of the ballot.
Even those voters who view the software companies' claim of creating an audit trail with suspicion cannot doubt the ability of Internet voting at the polling station to resolve the problem with a print-out of the
paper ballot. The ballot could be internally stored or printed out for the
voter to place into a special voting box. In the event of electoral doubt,
election officials could check the accuracy of the system by manually
counting the paper ballots. This satisfies the need for some to have a
paper trail and also allows election officials to closely scrutinize the voting system.
Such as system is in operation in Brazil, where the entire election is
now conducted using offline ATM-style e-voting technology. 1 18 In Brazil,
after a voter completes the voting process, the machine prints a receipt
located behind a Plexiglas covering which the voter can view. The receipt
116. The issue of auditability came to the forefront of debate in early-2003, when the
Santa Clara election board voted 3-2 to spend $20 million to purchase offline e-voting machines without a printed audit trail. The board negotiated to have printers installed at no
cost should it see the future need. Critics of e-voting had used this as a test case to lobby
against such machines. Silicon Valley Wary of Voting Machines, N.Y. Times (Feb. 25,
2003); Aron Goetzl, Proponents of Audit Trail Technology GarnerMixed Results In Santa
Clara, <http://www.electionline.org> (Feb. 27, 2003).
117. Unfortunately, such a system is not available in remote Internet voting and there
is no way presently known to create a paper trail during remote voting short of attempting
to have every voter print a receipt and send it to a central location. Status Report, supra n.
64, at 9.
118. Brazil phased in e-voting, first implementing it in local elections (1996) before introducing it to most federal electorates (1998) and finally the entire population (2002). See
Brazilian Electoral Office, <http://www.tse.gov.br>.
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indicates which candidates the machine has registered the votes for and
allows the voter to cancel out the votes and vote again if necessary. 1 19
On the other hand, having the voting machine print "receipts" could
potentially create more problems than it solves for a number of reasons.
First, printing a receipt adds further administrative and monetary burdens to the voting process. Moreover, the addition of printers is likely to
create a plethora of Election Day problems. Procedures would have to be
in place in the event of printer failure or malfunction and administrators
would have to guard against the possibility of printers running out of ink
or paper. Procedures would also have to be put in place in the event of a
voter claiming the printer did not accurately reflect how the voter wished
to vote, yet the vote was cast regardless. For these reasons, the printerrelated precaution, if adopted, should only be used in trials and phased
120
out as voters grow confident in the technology.
The 2000 Presidential election revealed that the current electoral
system is fraught with errors, inconsistencies, and uncertainty. The
painstaking process of manually counting and re-counting the ballots in
order to reach an election result (which may or may not have been accurate and complete) showed many Americans the chaotic nature of such a
system. This need not be the case, as Internet voting can bring stability
and integrity back into elections and so that election results accurately
reveal the intentions of the voters.
C.

SECURITY CONCERNS

Americans now rely on the Internet for both work and pleasure, and
collectively, more than 100 million Americans annually spend more than
twenty-eight billion dollars (as of 2000) through e-commerce and web
12 1
purchases, money transfers, bank transactions, and stock purchases.
So why do some Internet users frown upon using the technology to assist
the fledgling electoral process when existing security measures adequately protect Americans who transact over the Internet?
The answer apparently lies in the need for the electoral process to
get the entire election correct the first time, every time. While e-commerce has a good track record for security, we realize and accept that
119. Approximately three percent of the paper-ballots are checked against the recorded
votes to ensure the accuracy of the system. Holli Riebeck, Electronic Voting in the Amazon,
<http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/wonews/octO2/brazil2.html>.
120. A former electoral administrator claimed, "(having a printer installed at the polling
machine) would create a lot more problems then it solves." Silicon Valley Wary of Voting
machines, supra n. 116.
121. Keith Regan, U.S. Online Spending Up 62 Percent in 2000, <http://www.ecom
mercetimes.com/perl/story/7537.html> (Feb. 15, 2001).
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some level of fraud exists in Internet transactions. 1 2 2 Electoral systems
do not have that luxury. Even a small hiccup in a voting system could
cause irreparable harm to the electoral system and democratic process.
The 2000 Presidential election proved that minor procedural deviations
combined with electoral oversight could quickly turn an advanced electoral and democratic system of a highly sophisticated nation into a tangled
fiasco.
For that reason, software companies have provided numerous safeguards protecting the electoral process from security breaches. These
necessary safeguards create a fundamental trade-off between the convenience of the voter and the security of the voting system. As convenience
is added to the electoral process by allowing people to vote remotely, security of the vote is reduced; thus, as security measures are increased,
12 3
some of the convenience associated with Internet voting dwindles.
Security breaches have the potential to irreparably damage an election and can occur in two ways: (1) by an attack that targets the client or
server directly, commonly called a penetration attack; or (2) by an attack
between the client and the
that targets and interrupts communication 124
server, commonly called a denial of service.
1.

User and the Server

Penetration attacks occur when a hacker transports a virus to its
target by one of a variety of mediums, including floppy disk, CD-ROM,
download, e-mail or by exploitation of an existing bug or security flaw in
the targets computer or browser. Penetration attacks are a common occurrence and difficult to defend against.' 2 5 Once the virus is transported
and in place, the hacker can do as he or she pleases and could easily spy
on users casting their ballots, prevent users from casting their ballots, or
122. Ed Gerck, From Voting to Internet Voting, The Bell 1, 5 (2000) (Gerck estimates ten
percent of transactions are the subject of fraud); Craig Bickenell, Credit CardFraudBedevils Web, <http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,18904,00.html> (Apr. 5, 2002) (Bickenell states five to six percent of Internet transactions are fraudulent).
123. Such security measures, which could impact upon the convenience of voting include having voters pre-register for online voting, sending a CD-Rom to voters to install
and/or sending a password and PIN number to the voter. Richard M. Schum, Internet Voting: Its Perils and Promise, <http://www.netvoting.com> (May 9, 2002); David Elliott, Examining Internet Voting in Washington, State of Washington White Paper 4 (May 3, 2002)
(available at <http://www.electioncenter.org/voting/InetVotingWhitePaper.html>).
124. Avi Rubin, Security Considerationsfor Remote Electronic Voting Over the Internet,
<http://www.avirubin.com/e-voting.security.html> (Jan. 11, 2003) (detailing Internet security considerations).
125. Id. at 2-3. There have been numerous well-documented instances where hacking
has damaged or delayed major computer systems, including Yahoo, Hotmail and U.S. government sites. See e.g. The Centre for the Study of Technology and Society, <http:ll
www.tecsoc.org>.
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even modify a voter's ballot. 12 6 Even worse, the hacker can accomplish
all of the aforementioned activities without the voter's knowledge or detection from security measures such as encryption devices or anti-virus
1 27
software.
A successful remote Internet voting system must also protect
against a plethora of other hacker activities, including "man in the middle,"' 28 "page jacking," 129 or similar disruptive and highly damaging attacks that could be aimed at voters on Election Day. 130 These types of
attacks pose the same risks as other infiltration attack methods, yet are
much easier to carry out. Further, most encryption technologies cannot
3
guarantee success against a potential breach.' '
Voting experts feel that hacker-related security risks can be neutralized and that Internet voting could be at least as safe as the current
system of absentee voting. Some experts even conclude that, if administered appropriately, "Internet elections could pose less risk than traditional elections."1 3 2 This conclusion is based on the fact that current
security measures, such as Secure Sockets Layer ("SSL") technology,
have proven themselves to be safe means of transporting information
over the Internet. SSL technology is the most widely used method by ecommerce sites for submitting credit card information to process sales
and by banks to process account numbers, balance inquiries and money
transfers. SSL creates a confidential communications line between two
computers and encrypts the data as it is sent through the line, thereby
protecting it from outside interference. Security breaches with transmissions protected by SSL have been deemed a "pretty marginal problem,"
126. A trojan horse virus can be activated at any time after delivery, including remotely,
by timer, or by the detection of certain events by the host (or a combination of the above).
127. Encryption devices are only effective if they commence protection before hackers
gain access to the system. Moreover, even if the device successfully commences protection,
this kind of attack can target an area of the computer, which is not protected (encryption
protects only the operating system and browser). See IPI Report, supra n. 9, at 13-14.
128. Id. Man in the middle occurs when a hacker misleads the user into thinking they
are on the correct Web site when in fact they are on the hacker's site. The hacker collects
the information entered by the user for later fraudulent use while the user believes they
have successfully completed their business on the proper site.
129. Id. Page jacking occurs when a hacker leads a user off the intended Web site and
onto an impostor Web site. Once on the impostor site, the users browser is disabled and the
user is shown advertising or other information. The user then has some difficulty in accessing their intended Web site due to the blocks presented by the hacker.
130. Id. One example of another method used by hackers is "spamming," which floods
the system with requests to prevent the authorized user from responding to legitimate
requests.
131. Id. at 16.
132. Cherney, supra n. 59 (citing Sam Diaz, Arizona Democrats Can Vote Online in Primary, Knight-Ridder Trib. Bus. News (Mar. 3, 2000)).
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that tends to arise more with public terminals than home systems.133
However, software companies can provide even more security measures
to prevent fraudulent votes or hacker attacks by installing such measures as public key infrastructure ("PKI"), smart-card readers, biometric
authentication devices, and cryptographic devices.
In contrast, Internet voting at the polling station is inherently less
susceptible to outside hacker attacks and considerably safer than remote
Internet voting because election officials control the server and voting
software at the polling station. With reliable technology and support to
administer the voting system, it can easily be configured to prevent Internet communication with any outside server as well as prevent disgruntled workers from installing any additional software onto the
134
machines.
Both polling station and remote Internet voting have endured several trials and have not suffered from any electoral failure. The success
of the security systems protecting the trials is encouraging, but software
designers must constantly upgrade the system to prevent any possible
element of intrusion.
2.

Denial of Service

Election officials must also ensure that the path between the user
and server is secure. Providing a secure transmission requires an authenticated line between the user and server as well as the encrypted
transportation of data along that line. Current technologies can ensure
the latter through encryption technology (such as PKI). However, maintaining the authenticated communication link between user and server
is a much harder proposition.
Denial of service attacks focus on the path between the computer
user and the server. A hacker effectuates the attack by overloading a
Web site with requests for information, thus "jamming" the lines and
preventing others from using the site. 13 5 Currently there is no way to
stop the "jamming"without shutting down the system and thus shutting
out legitimate users until the diagnosis and network administration is
completed. 136 Before implementing Internet voting, election officials
133. Id.
134. As opposed to the open system used in remote Internet voting, online polling station voting uses a closed network system, where the voter's interface is not accessible remotely, thereby eliminating the threat of hacker attacks.
135. Daemons can be installed on a user's computer, without that user's knowledge, to
perpetuate the attack against a server or site.
136. Such an attack took place during the Canadian New Democratic Party (NDP) leadership convention on Jan. 25, 2003. The attack shut out legitimate users for 45 minutes
before the system could be corrected. Computer Vandal Delays Leadership Vote, <http:/!
www.cbc.ca/cgi-bin/templates/print.cgi?/2003/01/25ndp-delayO3O125> (Jan. 25, 2003).
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must ensure that the path between the computer user and the server
cannot be illegally beached.
Moreover, election officials must be able to guarantee with some certainty that their computer server will be able to effectively handle the
amount of Internet traffic created by large groups of people attempting
to vote at the same time. This problem, commonly referred to as a "bottleneck," is similar to jamming except that it is caused by an overwhelming number of legitimate users. As many Internet Web sites get millions
of hits per day, 13 7 this aspect of remote Internet voting should not be too
138
much of a problem with proper technical support.
Even though the likelihood of denial of service attacks and bottlenecks on polling station voting is minimal, the threat can be avoided entirely by designing a system, which allows voting to continue even if the
line of communication between the precinct and the server is lost. In
essence, to ensure the system is safe, the system switches to a direct
recording electronic (DRE) mode without losing a vote. 13 9 Using DRE,
votes would be recoverable even if the online system were corrupted beyond repair. Unfortunately, this fallback-system of DRE is only compatible with Internet voting at the polling station, as it is not feasible to
implement DRE on every remote computer. 140 Remote Internet voting
must therefore depend upon election officials providing the needed security to maintain a clear line of communication between the voter's server
and the central server, much like the absentee voter has to rely on the
U.S. postal service to maintain efficient and secure service to transport
the ballot to the election office.
The task of election officials developing, controlling, and maintaining a properly functioning and secure site to allow Internet voting is certainly feasible. In fact, the Swedish Internet Committee concluded that
137. One of the most visited Internet Web sites, CNN, gets 230,000 hits per minute on a
slow day and can get more than 2 million hits per minute during breaking news. Volera,
CNN Delivers Unprecedented Online Service, <http://www.volera.com/corporate/pressroom/
casestudies/cnn.html> (Jan. 8, 2003).
138. Some commentators claim the "traffic" problem can be avoided by allowing voting
over multiple days. While this system effectively operates with the postal voting, multiple
day voting has the potential to significantly effect the political advertising campaign of the
parties and may lead to situations of bribery or votes for favors.
139. DRE essentially operates as an offline, computerized e-voting system, where votes
are recorded, stored and tabulated electronically. For more analysis of offline, e-voting, see
Bryan Mercurio, Electronic Voting: Benefits and Burdens, 2002 Electoral Law Conference
(Dec. 6, 2002).
140. Leaving aside the financial and logistical costs of implementing DRE on personal
computers, it would be unacceptable for election officials to rely on voters to store and
transmit their vote in the event of a denial of service attack. Thus, in remote Internet
voting, the reliability of the communication between the computer and the server as well as
maintaining a functioning back-up server is much more critical.
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various security measures "fulfill reasonable requirements for a secure
system." 14 1 The California Internet Task Force, while recognizing there
are "significant" threats to the security and secrecy of Internet voting,
concluded the Internet could be used to develop a system which would be
at least as secure from vote-tampering as the current absentee ballot
process. 142
VI.
A.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

While social science issues are more abstract than security or costrelated concerns, the effect of Internet voting on the community must be
considered before implementing Internet voting. While Internet voting
at the polling station would have a minimal effect on the voting culture, 14 3 the advent of remote Internet voting on a widespread scale could
affect the voting culture quite substantially.
Opponents to remote Internet voting claim that its implementation
has the potential to destroy the social cohesion of voters and produce the
negative result of a divided society. Traditional voting is seen to promote
the community over the individual, where the civic duty of voting is ritualistically followed by all citizens, citizens whom for one moment in time
enjoy equal standing of all others, regardless of situation, wealth, color,
beliefs, or education. On the other hand, if one segment of society opts to
vote remotely instead of physically going to the polling station, the community ideals formed by voting are seen to disappear.
Recognizing there is some idealistic merit to the above argument, a
move to online voting would have to be done in such a way as to not
diminish or undermine the significance of the event and the sense of
community that voting creates. The above argument, however, counters
the modern trend of relaxing voting rules to encourage participation and
should not be an absolute bar to implementing remote Internet voting.
Voters are increasingly using the absentee ballot to cast their votes, even
when they do not have a legitimate excuse for not turning up at the polling station. In fact, political strategists and scholars estimate that more
than 15 percent of the vote is now cast before Election Day.14 4 Moreover,
141. See Swedish Report, supra n. 114, at 5.2.
142. California Task Force on Internet Voting, supra n. 31, at 1.
143. Voters would still travel to the polling booth to vote, but would vote via a computer
terminal or touch-screen machine as opposed to a pencil and paper. However, any form of
voting needs to have the voters' confidence, meaning issues regarding computer tabulations, malfunctions and the lack of an audit trail (all of which are discussed earlier) would
figure into the issue of voting culture.
144. Adam Nagourney, Early Voting Puts Many candidates in Early Overdrive, <www.
nytimes.com/2002/10/14/politics/14ELEC.html> (Oct. 14, 2002).
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as mentioned earlier, Oregon has now adopted an all-postal voting system, thereby completely destroying the social cohesion polling station
voting attempts to bring to the community. Therefore, allowing remote
Internet voting to supplement the current system will only add convenience and encourage greater participation in the voting process in the
same way that absentee voting has been doing for years.
Other social arguments against remote Internet voting generally revolve around the ideas that remote Internet voting could trivialize and
under-emphasize the meaning and importance of the electoral event.
Some opponents of Internet voting insist that voters will not give adequate thought to their choice or to the magnitude of the event if they do
it at home, work, or in an Internet caf6. As many voters have a fair idea
of the issues and their preferred candidates before entering the polling
station, the fact that a keyboard and screen are in front of them instead
of a pencil and paper does not alter the fact that the person still must
actively decide what to tick before they leave the corridor. In fact, proponents of Internet voting insist the contrary is true: voters will sit down to
vote and use the Internet to research the candidates and the issues
before selecting their preferred choices. 14 5 While the truth may lie somewhere in between the two opposing views, it is unlikely that remote Internet voting will have a dramatic effect on views regarding the
importance of the event or on the way Americans cast their ballots.
The effect of remote Internet voting on the election campaign is another area that concerns many commentators. Some advocates of remote
Internet voting claim that it could give voters the opportunity to vote
over several days, instead of the traditional one-day period for voting.
They claim that a multiple-day voting period would add convenience to
the process and reduce the likelihood of Internet traffic, which can cause
server delays. While the necessity of multiple-day voting is open to debate, the change multiple-day voting is not likely to have an impact on
the election campaign if remote Internet voting is only a supplement to,
and not a replacement of, polling station voting. While political campaigns are currently designed to end with the culmination of a one-day
election, election officials already tolerate a certain amount of early voting in the form of absentee voting. Unless remote Internet voting becomes the norm used by a vast majority of voters, the effect of remote
Internet voting on election campaigns is likely to be minimal.
Finally, opponents of remote Internet voting claim that the use of
Internet technology will alter the existing structure of our nation's delib145. Of course, the Internet gives virtually anyone with a computer to "publish." Thus,
while information is plentiful on the Internet, the quality and consistency of information is
often inconsistent and unreliable.
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erative democracy. 146 Our federal framework, complete with separation
of powers, sufficient checks and balances against the arms of the government and a bicameral legislature, quite deliberately promotes deliberation over efficiency and substantially limits the excesses of direct
democracy. Opponents claim that the advent of remote Internet voting
could substantially undermine the system, as the Internet could be seen
as an end run to the legislative process and be used to overcome logistical and economic barriers to more frequent elections or referenda. Opponents envision a situation where politicians could threaten the integrity
and character of our system of government by seeking to please the electorate or avoiding tough decisions by referring the issue to referendum;
this process of direct democracy could lead to frequent referenda in opposition to genuine reflection and would not serve the best interests of
Americans.
The chances of such a slippery slope argument towards deliberative
democracy being realized are unrealistic. Equality and fairness dictate
that all voters must have the ability to cast their ballots. As not all voters
have access to remote computers and thus, would not have the ability to
cast their ballots in the repeated plebiscites envisioned by opponents of
remote Internet voting, this argument really is a non-issue. Moreover,
even in the unlikely scenario of a vast majority of voters opting to use
remote Internet voting, equality still would mandate that polling stations remain open for those voters not able to use the Internet option.
Therefore, the cost and administrative burden of repeatedly organizing
polling stations for frequent plebiscites would make this option
unworkable.
B.

LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

Any electoral system built on a weak legislative foundation creates
opportunities for electoral challenges and lawsuits. The absence of tangible public scrutiny and a recognizable audit trail could trouble losing
candidates and their supporters and may also lead to challenges in the
courts. If the recent 2002 Congressional elections can be used as a guide,
then, when all else fails, losing candidates will once again rely on the
failure of the e-voting system to accurately record votes as an excuse.
The argument is rarely valid, as the majority of faults are a result of
human error causing the machine to "malfunction," and candidates who
initially blame e-voting often quickly abandon such allegations and move
147
onto electoral administration or other reasons to blame for their loss.
While legislation cannot completely avoid such questions, legislation
can and must be drafted in such a way to minimize these instances from
146. Schum, supra n. 123, at 9.
147. For numerous instances of this occurring, see <electionline.org>.
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occurring. In addition, legislation must be drafted in such a way as to
effectively handle disputes and lawsuits that may arise in the course of
and following an election.
The prospect of implementing any form of Internet voting requires
substantial review and reform of the current electoral laws in light of a
changing environment. The current system effectively handles conventional voting offences and abuses but may not be sufficient for new risks
posed by the Internet. In order to implement any form of Internet voting, the various federal and state electoral acts would have to be scrutinized to ascertain which sections would need amending to accommodate
the technology. For instance, legislation referring to "ballot-papers" or
similar references to traditional forms of voting would have to be
amended. In addition, provisions relating to a "recount" and events that
trigger such an action would also have to be amended and updated for an
Internet voting environment. 148 Moreover, it would be imperative to add
several new sections to the legislation regarding the tabulation of the
votes, such as an amendment banning election officials from releasing
voting information until the close of the polls (as the publication of results before other stations have closed could dissuade voters from
voting).149
In addition, special care would need to be taken in drafting provisions relating to the criminalization of all forms of corrupting or tampering with or attempting to corrupt or tamper with polling station e-voting
machines. While some provisions of various electoral acts contain blanket statements against interfering with the electoral process, the accuracy of the machines is essential to the success of an Internet-based
election. Therefore, special consideration of the changing environment
and stiff penalties would have to be specifically addressed in the
legislation.
While the amendments needed to implement Internet voting stations at polling booths appear straight forward, amending the respective
Acts to allow remote Internet voting is a more complicated task. For instance, remote Internet voting would mandate the legislation being further amended to prohibit and criminalize a person from stealing,
coercing, buying, selling, or giving away their digital signature and/or
vote. 150 In addition, the Act, in association with other laws, would have
to criminalize all forms of hacking into the voting system as well as jamming or reducing access/spamming the voting system to prevent the offi148. Other issues which need revisiting include ballot secrecy and privacy issues.
149. Prohibiting officials from even collating the results may be considered to prevent
leaks to the press.
150. While anti-bribery laws may arguably already cover such activities, specifically
legislating against such activity is recommended.
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cials from responding to legitimate requests.
Moreover, amendments must also prohibit persons from page jacking or spoofing sites for the purposes of intentionally deceiving or otherwise impeding the legitimate user in casting their vote. Further, the
legislation should also include a section criminalizing the invasion of privacy by attacking a ballot or Web site with intent to examine or change
votes.
Another primary concern associated with Internet voting is one of
jurisdiction. As the Internet is not controlled by one sovereign entity, but
rather an uncontrolled, international medium, the government and election officials need to seriously consider the consequences of implementing remote Internet voting. The law relating to a security breach or act
of fraud occurring online due to the act of a foreign national not within
the jurisdiction is an unsolved problem. Leaving aside the challenge of
even finding the culprit, an overseas, foreign national may not be subject
to prosecution within the U.S. without the use of long-arm statutes and
extradition treaties. 152 As foreign laws may differ in their criteria for an
offence or in their application, the foreign nation holding jurisdiction
over the offender may not submit the offender for extradition.

VII.

THE FUTURE

Before fully implementing Internet voting, further studies need to
take place across a wide range of disciplines. Specifically, technical experts need to improve the Internet voting systems overall, particularly
security and encryption technology, so that election officials can safely
implement the system for use by the widespread voting public. 15 3 In addition, political scientists must study the effect of Internet voting on public confidence of the electoral process, the effect on participation and the
effect on the character of elections. Finally, lawyers need to analyze the
existing electoral laws and develop new laws that ensure that electoral
failure does not result from a legal breakdown.
151. Again, while electoral acts have provisions banning the intentional interference
with electoral administration, specific sections criminalizing this activity is recommended.
152. The use of reciprocal agreements among nations to effect multinational jurisdiction
and enforcement actions such as apprehension and extradition of suspects is crucial to successfully implementing remote Internet voting. Failing that, nations will have to rely on
international laws to respect the democratic elections and processes of a sovereign nation
and protect that nation from incursions, which seek to destroy or undermine security and
stability of the democratic process of a nation.
153. Electoral officials would be wise to consider a certification program for any e-voting
system. The program should have strict security and reliability standards as well as strong
verification of systems. It would also be wise to use pre-existing open source code e-voting
systems as models to base improvements. While the use of open source codes may inhabit
some intellectual property rights, the trade-off of a more secure system, which is open to
public scrutiny far outweighs the negative effect on proprietary rights.
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Public trials of Internet voting also must be expanded. Only with
experience can election officials gauge how a system works and only with
experience can technical experts, social scientists and lawyers assess the
strengths and weaknesses of a system and make it a viable option for
154
future elections.
Internet voting trials have thus far been successful and encouraging,
yet many remain skeptical of the technology. For this reason, a slow,
evolutionary change is needed to introduce Internet voting into our electoral culture. 155 Such change can be accomplished through a gradual introduction of Internet voting accomplished by a two-phase introduction
approach. Phase I would utilize Internet voting technology in the existing polling stations by allowing voters the choice of voting at the polling station via the Internet or by traditional methods. 156 Phase II would
eventually introduce remote Internet voting to the electorate when the
technology is ready and when the voters have sufficient confidence in evoting systems. This slow, gradual approach would allow for constant
monitoring, security, testing and improvements and avoid introducing a
radical change that could weaken voter confidence in the electoral
process. 157
Unlike many other nations studying Internet voting, the U.S. has
sufficiently laid the initial groundwork for the transition to Internet voting through the public and private trials detailed earlier in this article.
Therefore, the next step for Internet voting is its gradual introduction in
binding, public elections. The evolutionary approach to introducing Internet voting is not without its challenges or risks, but those potential
pitfalls can be minimized through careful planning and implementation.
Although Internet voting could be introduced in several ways, below is a
list of recommended avenues for its introduction into the American electoral landscape.

154. The IPI Report stated trials could be used "to gain valuable experience prior to fullscale implementation." IPI Report, supra n. 9, at 2. "The security problems that might arise
might well undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process," said David Cheney of the
Internet Policy Institute. National Science Foundation Press Release, Internet Voting Is
No "Magic Ballot," Distinguished Committee Reports, <http://nsf.vov/od/lpa/news/press/Ol/
prOll8.htm> (accessed Jan. 15, 2003). "We must dispel the myths associated with Internet
voting and educate public officials to avoid this scenario." Id.
155. See e.g. California Task Force on Internet Voting, supra n. 31, at 2; Status Report,
supra n. 64; Hoffman supra n. 106; Swedish Report, supra n. 114, at 5.4.
156. While acknowledging the long-term benefits of remote Internet voting, the IPI report instead recommended Internet voting at the polling, where election officials could
maintain control of the security and technology. Report Pans Internet Voting, supra n. 30.
157. See California Internet Voting Task Force, supra n. 31, at 2.
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Limited Polling Station Voting

The first step towards an Internet voting option could the introduction of polling stations for a limited number of voters. This limited trial
could take place at select polling stations to test the security, accuracy
and ability of Internet voting while providing the voter with more conve158
nience and voting options.
The trial would also introduce the concept of Internet voting to the
electorate in a comfortable atmosphere without radically changing the
familiar voting surroundings. Over time and with successive successful
elections with Internet voting, voters will likely get acclimated to the
system and acquire the same level of confidence in Internet voting that
they have in traditional voting methods.
In addition to introducing Internet voting to the electorate, a limited-scale trial such as this would attract significant media attention,
which, if successfully operated, would generate even more attention and
excitement.
2.

Overseas Voters

American citizens currently living or traveling abroad would be another potential trial market for Internet voting. This option could be implemented in a number of different ways and could be used to trial
polling station or remote Internet voting.
One possible trial could simulate polling station voting and give
overseas voters the option of voting via the Internet at the selected overseas polling stations (possible locations include the local American Embassy or Diplomatic Mission). 1 59 Voters would turn-up at the designated
polling station and, after clearing the normal identity checks, cast their
60
vote electronically via the Internet.1
Another, more advanced option for an Internet trial would allow voters to register as an overseas voter and give them the option of voting
remotely over the Internet. In the initial stages, voters would likely be
given PIN and CD-ROM (for reasons of security and browser compatibility) but with time other, less intrusive methods could be trialed. Voters
would then log onto the voting Web site from any location and cast their
ballot via the Internet.
158. The trial would be similar to the U.S. Dept. of Defense trial and limited in size and
scope to only involve a certain percent of the electorate, which, in the unlikely event of
failure, would not have a great impact on the election results.
159. Polling stations could either have hard-copies of the electoral roll or access the roll
electronically to verify the voter is eligible to vote and in what jurisdiction.
160. In real-time or once polling has ended, the secure polling station server could send
the votes via the Internet to secure servers in the appropriate jurisdiction of each voter.
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Another alternative for trialing Internet voting with overseas voters
would simply update the current process used for absentee voting,
whereby requested ballots would be distributed via secure-email. The
voter would then have the choice of returning the ballot via secure e-mail
or printing out the ballot and returning it, along with their signature for
16 1
verification, via the post.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The 2000 Presidential election proved that the current voting systems used in the U.S. are not sufficient to maintain the level of integrity
required in a sophisticated democracy.162 Equipment once thought-off as
near perfect electoral aids, such as the lever-operated machines and
punch cards readers, in fact could and have become highly contentious
and undesirable. Moreover, it soon became apparent that the system as a
whole cannot be trusted to count and tabulate all the votes in an equal
manner. The 2000 election revealed that the system was procedurally
and systemically unsound and in need of drastic, rather than minor,
change.
Internet voting has been championed by some as a miracle cure for
the current ills of our electoral system. But one must remember that,
like any voting system, it too has its potential drawbacks and flaws. After the initial euphoria surrounding the prospects of Internet voting
swept the electoral world, the issue was studied in further detail and the
promise of Internet voting convenience was replaced by overarching issues of security and reliability. But some in the electoral community
have come to realize that, when compared to the current voting technologies, Internet voting is a reasonable voting alternative.
There is no perfect system of voting and there will never be such a
system. But the current system is not sustainable and unless the trend
of continual electoral failings is reversed, American democracy will continue to suffer. Internet voting may be the only solution to curb dwindling participation rates and add more convenience and stability to the
electoral system.
161. This system would substantially cut-down the bulk and costs of election materials
sent overseas during the election campaign while not radically departing from traditional
absentee voting.
162. Ironically, the failing of traditional voting methods in Florida stunted the progress
of technological advancement. Instead of moving forward with major initiatives, post-Florida electoral officials are concentrating on fixing the present system before embracing an
alternative voting system. Ed Gerck, CEO of Safevote.com, stated, "I would say Internet
voting would have been better served without Florida. The same way Florida advanced the
need for technology, (was) the same way Florida highlighted the tremendous risks."
Farhad Manjoo, Net Voting? Keep Your Pants On, <http://www.wired.com/news/politics/
0,1283,41648,00.html> (accessed May 9, 2002).
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The long-term question then becomes to what level of risk should
Internet voting be judged? Should Internet voting be held to the same
standard of traditional voting or to a higher standard? Most problems
associated with Internet voting are not foreign to the electoral process,
just problems cast in a different form. Security and other weaknesses are
inherent in the traditional voting methods. So to hold e-voting to a 100
percent secure record would be unfair and create a different playing
field.
In the short-term, Internet voting at the polling station could feasibly be instituted within the next few election cycles. The moderate benefits of Internet voting at the polling station, such as less invalid votes
and quick, accurate results, come with considerably less risks than remote Internet voting.
Further study into the area is needed to assess the viability and
risks of Internet voting. 16 3 It is imperative that election officials have
the foresight and initiative to actively research into this important area
of our democracy. Further, and maybe of equal importance, Internet voting can only be implemented when the level of risk associated with its
implementation is acceptable to election officials, politicians, and American voters. While it appears that currently Internet voting at the polling
station is a reasonable level of risk, the level of risk presently associated
with remote Internet voting may simply be too great. Maybe in time, the
information garnered from further trials and evolutionary introduction
of Internet voting will cause election officials and the voting public to
accept remote Internet voting as a safe, effective, and efficient way to
vote.
The article will end not with a conclusion but with a question. In
response to questioning about Internet voting, Kevin Kennedy, executive
director of Wisconsin state election board stated, "(t)here are a lot of
questions about Internet voting. For example, how can we be assured
that the person who gets a ballot over the Internet is the person who is
supposed to be voting and how can we assure the people that there bal164
lots are being properly handled?"
My questions to Mr. Kennedy: First, under the current system of
voting in the U.S., how can we be assured that the person who gets a
ballot is the person who is supposed to be voting? Second, in light of the
problems with the 2000 and 2002 elections, can we really assure the people that their ballots are being properly handled under the current system of voting?
163. Because issues relate to security, convenience and cost, the research must be crossdisciplinary and include social scientists, IT specialists, electoral administrators, and lawyers in a collaborative effort.
164. City may conduct elections on Internet. Rinard, supra n. 108.

456

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXII

We can only begin to restore our fledgling democracy when we accept that the answers to both questions above are a resounding "no."
Once we admit defeat, why not further study Internet voting as a possible remedy for the current state of our democracy?

